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Abstract
This paper generalizes existing connections between automata and logic to a coalgebraic abstraction level.
Let F: Set to Set be a standard functor that preserves weak pullbacks. We introduce various notions of
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introduce a language of coalgebraic ﬁxed point logic for F-coalgebras, and we provide a game semantics for
this language. Finally, we show that the two approaches are equivalent in expressive power. We prove that
any coalgebraic ﬁxed point formula can be transformed into an F-automaton that accepts precisely those
pointed F-coalgebras in which the formula holds. And conversely, we prove that any F-automaton can be
converted into an equivalent ﬁxed point formula that characterizes the pointed F-coalgebras accepted by the
automaton.
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1. Introduction
There is a long and respectable tradition in theoretical computer science linking the research
ﬁelds of automata theory and logic. This link becomes particularly strong when automata are used
to classify inﬁnite objects like words, trees or graphs. Interestingly, this research area has provided
not only fundamental theoretical results, such as Rabin’s decidability theorem [22], but also quite
concrete applications in computer science, such as tools for the automatic veriﬁcation of reactive
systems, see for instance [6] on model checking. Of the many results that have been obtained in
recent years, let us just mention the characterization, by Janin and Walukiewicz [13], of the modal
-calculus as the bisimulation invariant fragment of monadic second order logic over the class
of all labelled transition systems. Applications in logic of fundamental automata theoretic results
are generally based on the observation that there is no fundamental distinction between automata
and formulas. This holds of the results of Janin and Walukiewicz, who introduce the notion of an
alternating parity automaton operating on labelled transition systems to capture the formulas of
the modal -calculus. For an up to date introduction to the world of automata, logic and inﬁnite
games, we refer the reader to Gradel et al. [7].
Now in general, it has come out that most of the key results in automata theory can be proved
for word and tree automata alike, and many of these results can even be formulated and proved
for automata that operate on more complex objects such as graphs or labelled transition systems.
The approach of Niwin´ski [20] lifts the theory to a higher level of generality where automata are
devices operating on arbitrary relational structures. It is our intention here take a natural further
abstraction step, namely, to study the area from a coalgebraic perspective. In fact, much of the work
in this particular border area of (modal) logic and automata theory has a strong coalgebraic ﬂavor.
In itself this should not come as a surprise, since the kind of objects (words, trees, graphs, . . .) that
are studied here admit a natural coalgebraic presentation, and both (modal) logic and automata
theory admit a lucrative coalgebraic perspective.
This certainly applies to logic, and to modal logic in particular. Since coalgebra can be seen as
a very general model of state-based dynamics, and modal logic as a logic for dynamic systems,
there are interesting links between the two ﬁelds. One of the ﬁrst to realize this, in the late 1980s,
was Abramsky [1]. Barwise and Moss [4], a rich source of material on a great variety of circu-
lar systems, contains the outline of Moss’ general approach towards coalgebraic logic, discussed
in more detail by Moss [17]. Over subsequent years, the development and study of modal lan-
guages for the speciﬁcation of properties of coalgebras has been actively pursued and studied by
various authors, including Baltag [3], Jacobs [10], Kurz [15], Pattinson [21], and Rößiger [23]. How-
ever, given the intended application of coalgebraic modal languages as speciﬁcation formalisms
restricting the behavior of state-based systems, it is rather surprising that until now no languages
have been developed that incorporate explicit ﬁxed point operators. In addition, the only work on
coalgebraic modal languages in which specimens of ﬁxed point formulas are admitted, or in which
the need for coalgebraic modal ﬁxed point logics is discussed, seems to be by Jacobs ([11,9],
respectively).
When it comes to the coalgebraic perspective on automata theory, the standard deterministic
and non-deterministic automata operating on ﬁnite words have been recognized as paradigmatic
examples of coalgebras, as any introduction to the ﬁeld of coalgebra witnesses. As an example of
more substantial work in this area we refer the reader to Rutten [24,25]. However, as far as we are
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aware, automata as (ﬁnitary) objects classifying possibly inﬁnite coalgebras, have until now not
been studied from an explicitly coalgebraic perspective.
Summarizing the above discussion, we ﬁnd that the relation between automata theory and (mod-
al) logic has been investigated intensively and successfully, and has a strong coalgebraic ﬂavor.
Various modal languages have been developed, in a uniform fashion, for coalgebras of arbitrary
type, but none of these languages admit explicit ﬁxed point operators. And lastly, we see that cer-
tain kinds of automata have been identiﬁed as coalgebras, but automata for classifying arbitrary
coalgebras have not been developed. It thus seems that there is a clear gap here, and it is precisely
this gap that we intend to start ﬁlling with this paper.
We believe that the connections between automata and logic could and perhaps should be
studied from a general, coalgebraic perspective. The aim for developing such a coalgebraic
framework is not so much to develop new ideas in automata theory, as to provide a com-
mon generalization for existing notions that are known from the theory of more speciﬁc kinds
of automata. This abstract perspective could then be of use for many purposes. For instance,
it could be instrumental to ﬁnd the right notion of automaton for other kinds of coalgebras.
It could also be employed to prove interesting results on coalgebraic logics. And ﬁnally, it may
ﬁnd applications in the form of uniform proofs for key results in automata theory, and hence,
increase our understanding of the ﬁeld.
Themain purpose of this article, which grew out of the conference paper [28], is to introduce such
a coalgebraic perspective on automata theory. We conﬁne our attention to functors F : Set → Set
which are standard (that is, preserve injections) and preserve weak pullbacks—such functors will be
calledR-standard in this paper. In Section 2, we will say a bit more on this restriction. For each such
functor F, we will deﬁne the notion of an F-automaton; the purpose of these devices is to classify
pointed F-coalgebras (pairs consisting of an F-coalgebra and an element of the carrier set of the
coalgebra). The criterion under which such an automaton  accepts or rejects a pointed coalgebra
(, s) is formulated in terms of an inﬁnite two-player game, to be played on a certain graph induced
by  and .
We also introduce a language LF of coalgebraic ﬁxed point logic for F-coalgebras. This
language is ﬁnitary in the sense that every formula comes with a ﬁnite set of subformulas.
Combining ideas from the game semantics for the modal -calculus as formulated by Janin
and Walukiewicz [12], and the semantic games for coalgebraic languages introduced by Baltag
[3], in Theorem 1 we provide a game-theoretic semantics for this language LF. Finally, the
resemblance between these games and the acceptance games for F-automata leads to the main
technical results of the paper: Theorem 2 states that any LF-formula can be transformed into
a certain kind of F-automaton that accepts precisely those pointed F-coalgebras in which the
formula is true. And Theorem 3 states that, conversely, with any F-automaton we may asso-
ciate a LF-formula holding precisely at those pointed F-coalgebras that are accepted by the
automaton. However, we do not put much focus on technical results, since we believe that the
main contribution of the paper is of a conceptual nature.
It should bementioned that there are other approaches in which the notion of automaton is lifted
to a category-theoretic level. For instance, there is a series of articles by Arbib and Manes and a
theory of functorial automata developed by Adámek, Trnková and others, see [2] (also for further
references). Although this work bears some resemblance to ours, there are at least two differences:
ﬁrst, the mentioned research focuses on an algebraic rather than a coalgebraic framework, and
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second, it generalizes automata for ﬁnite rather than for inﬁnite objects. Nevertheless, it would be
useful to investigate the precise connection with this line of research.
Overview
We ﬁrst ﬁx notation and terminology on Set-based functors and coalgebras, and deﬁne R-
standard functors; we also give a brief introduction to two-person inﬁnite parity graph games. In
Section 3, we introduce our coalgebraic perspective on automata theory by reviewing some of the
more familiar kinds of automata. Section 4 provides the general deﬁnition of F-automata for R-
standard functors (in many different but equivalent ﬂavors), and gives a detailed description of the
acceptance games for F-automata. Then we move to logic: in Section 5 we introduce the syntax
and semantics of the coalgebraic ﬁxed point logic LF for coalgebras over an R-standard functor
F. The next section provides the details of the game-theoretic approach to the semantics of this
language. Section 7 states and proves the above-mentioned main results of the paper. We ﬁnish the
paper with a list of ideas for further research.
2. Preliminaries
This paper presupposes some familiarity with the basic concepts of coalgebra and automata
theory. The main purpose of this section is to ﬁx notation and terminology. We also give a very
brief introduction to so-called graph games.
2.1. Set-based functors and coalgebras
2.1.1. Basics
We let Set denote the category of sets with functions. For an endofunctor F : Set → Set,
an F-coalgebra is a pair  = (S , ) consisting of a set S and a function  : S → FS . A pointed
F-coalgebra is a pair (, s) such that  is an F-coalgebra and s is an element of (the underly-
ing set of) . Given two F-coalgebras  = (S , ) and ′ = (S ′, ′), a function f : S → S ′ is an
F-coalgebra morphism or F-homomorphism if F(f) ◦  = ′ ◦ f . The category Coalg(F) has the
F-coalgebras as objects and the F-homomorphisms as arrows. A relation Z ⊆ S × S ′ is an F-
bisimulation if we can impose coalgebra structure 
 : Z → FZ on Z in such a way that the two
projections  : Z → S and ′ : Z → S ′ are F-coalgebra morphisms. We write Z : , s↔ ′, s′ if
Z is a bisimulation between  and ′ that links s ∈ S to s′ ∈ S ′, and , s↔ ′, s′ if there is
such a Z .
Functors and relators. LetRel denote the categorywith sets as objects and binary relations asmor-
phisms. Identity arrows in this category are given, for any set S , byS = {(s, s) | s ∈ S}; composition
of arrows in this category is ordinary relation composition, denoted by ◦. A functor Q : Rel → Rel
is called a relator.
It is well-known that Set can be embedded in Rel by the graph functor which is the identity
on sets and maps a function f : S → T to its graph Gr(f) = {(s, f(s))|s ∈ S}. We say that a relator
Q : Rel → Rel extends a functor F : Set → Set if it satisﬁes (i) QS = FS for all sets S , and (ii)
Q(Gr(f)) = Gr(F(f)) for all functions f : S → T .
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Extensions need not always exist, but are unique if they do; we denote the extension of the functor
F by F. The image F(R) ⊆ FS × FT of a relation R ⊆ S × T is called the relation lifting of R under F.
It can be proved that an endofunctor on Set can be extended to a relator if and only if it preserves
weak pullbacks. This result is usually attributed to Carboni et al. [5], but it also follows as a special
case of an earlier result by Trnková, see [27, Observation 2.10], or [2, section V.2.10] for a proof. In
the sequel we will need the following fact; details can be found in Rutten [26] (or be proved easily).
We use (·)˘ to denote relation converse.
Fact 1. Let F : Set → Set be a functor that preserves weak pullbacks. Then
1. The relator F extending F is given, for R ⊆ S × S ′, by F(R) = Gr(F()) ◦ Gr(F(′))˘.
2. F is monotone, that is, if R ⊆ Q then F(R) ⊆ F(Q).
3. F commutes with taking relation converse: F(R˘) = (FR)˘.
4. Z is a bisimulation between  and ′ iff ((s), ′(s′)) ∈ FZ for all (s, s′) ∈ Z.
R-standard functors. A functor F : Set → Set is called standard if it preserves inclusions; that is,
whenever f : A ↪→ B is an inclusion, then so is F(f) : FA ↪→ FB. We need the following property,
proved in Adámek and Trnková [2].
Fact 2. Let F be a standard endofunctor on Set. Then F preserves ﬁnite intersections, that is: F(A ∩ B)
= FA ∩ FB.
As an immediate consequence of this, one can show that if an object  belongs to a set FA for
some ﬁnite set A, then there is a smallest subset Base () ⊆ A such that  ∈ FBase (). As we will
see further on, this observation enormously facilitates the deﬁnition of the notion of a subformula
of a formula.
Through most of this paper we will be working with endofunctors on Set that are both standard
and preserve weak pullbacks.While both kinds of restriction are quite familiar from the coalgebraic
literature—see for instance Moss [17], the constraint on standardness is seemingly very ‘non-cat-
egorical.’ Fortunately, it is completely harmless, as was pointed out by Jiri Adámek and Stefan
Milius: In Adámek and Trnková [2], it was proved that every set functor F is naturally isomorphic
to a standard functor F′ such that F and F′ coincide on all nonempty sets. From this it follows that
the categories Coalg(F) and Coalg(F′) are isomorphic.
In any case, it is convenient to introduce terminology.
Deﬁnition 2.1. A functor F : Set → Set is called R-standard if it is standard and preserves weak
pullbacks.
As a useful property of R-standard functors, we mention the following.
Proposition 2.2. Let F be an R-standard endofunctor on Set. Suppose that (,) ∈ FZ for some rela-
tion Z ⊆ A× B, and that A′ and B′ are subsets of A and B, respectively, such that  ∈ FA′ and  ∈ FB′.
Then we have (,) ∈ F(Z ∩ (A′ × B′)).
Proof. Let, for two sets X ⊆ Y , XY : X ↪→ Y denote the inclusion map. Then by standardness of
F we have that F(XY ) = FXFY . Now let A,A′,B,B′,Z , and  be as stated above. Then it is im-
mediate that (,) ∈ Gr(FA′FA) ◦ FZ ◦ Gr(FB′FB) .˘ But a straightforward calculation, using earlier
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mentioned properties of F, shows that Gr(FA′FA) ◦ FZ ◦ Gr(FB′FB)˘ = F(Gr(A′A) ◦ Z ◦ Gr(B′B)˘).
From this the proposition is immediate. 
2.2. Graph games
Two-player inﬁnite graph games, or graph games for short, are deﬁned as follows. For a more
comprehensive account of these games, the reader is referred to Gradel et al. [7].
First some preliminaries on sequences. Given a set A, let A∗, Aω and A denote the collections
of ﬁnite, inﬁnite, and all, sequences over A, respectively. (Thus, A = A∗ ∪ Aω.) Given  ∈ A∗ and
 ∈ A we deﬁne the concatenation of  and  in the obvious way, and we denote this element of A
simply by juxtaposition: . Given an inﬁnite sequence  ∈ Aω, let Inf () denote the set of elements
a ∈ A that occur inﬁnitely often in .
A graph game is played on a board B, that is, a set of positions. Each position b ∈ B belongs to one
of the two players, ∃ (Éloise) and ∀ (Abélard). Formally we write B = B∃ ∪ B∀, and for each position
b we use P(b) to denote the player i such that b ∈ Bi . Furthermore, the board is endowed with a
binary relation E, so that each position b ∈ B comes with a set E[b] ⊆ B of successors. Formally, we
say that the arena of the game consists of a directed bipartite graph  = (B∃,B∀,E).
Amatch of the game consists of the two players moving a pebble around the board, starting from
some initial position b0. When the pebble arrives at a position b ∈ B, it is player P(b)’s turn to move;
(s)he can move the pebble to a new position of their liking, but the choice is restricted to a successor
of b. Should E[b] be empty then we say that player P(b) got stuck at the position. A match or play
of the game thus constitutes a (ﬁnite or inﬁnite) sequence of positions b0b1b2 . . . such that biEbi+1
(for each i such that bi and bi+1 are deﬁned). A full play is either (i) an inﬁnite play or (ii) a ﬁnite
play in which the last player got stuck. A non-full play is called a partial play.
The rules of the game associate a winner and (thus) a looser for each full play of the game. A
ﬁnite full play is lost by the player who got stuck; the winning condition for inﬁnite games is given
by a subset Ref of Bω (Ref is short for ‘referee’): our convention is that ∃ is the winner of  ∈ Bω
precisely if  ∈ Ref . A graph game is thus formally deﬁned as a structure G = (B∃,B∀,E,Ref ).
Sometimes we want to restrict our attention to matches of a game with a certain initial position; in
this case we will speak of a game that is initialized at this position.
Various kinds of winning conditions are known. In a parity game, the set Ref is deﬁned in terms
of a parity function on the board B, that is, a map  : B→ ω with ﬁnite range. More speciﬁcally,
the set Ref is of the form
Bω := { ∈ Bω | max{ (b) : b ∈ Inf ()} is even}. (1)
A strategy for player i is a function mapping partial plays  = b0 · · · bn with P(bn) = i to admis-
sible next positions, that is, to elements of E[bn]. In such a way, a strategy tells i how to play: a
play  is conform or consistent with strategy f for i if for every proper initial sequence b0 · · · bn of
 with P(bn) = i, we have that bn+1 = f(b0 · · · bn). A strategy is history free if it only depends on
the current position of the match, that is, f() = f(′) whenever  and ′ are partial plays with
the same last element (which belongs to the appropriate player). A strategy is winning for player i
from position b ∈ B if it guarantees i to win any match with initial position b, no matter how the
adversary plays—note that this deﬁnition also applies to positions b for which P(b) /= i. A position
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b ∈ B is called a winning position for player i, if i has a winning strategy from position b; the set of
winning positions for i in a game G is denoted asWin i(G).
Parity games form an important game model because they have many attractive properties, such
as history-free determinacy.
Fact 3. Let G = (B∃,B∀,E, ) be a parity graph game. Then
1. G is determined: B =Win ∃(G) ∪Win ∀(G).
2. Each player i has a history free strategy which is winning from any position in Win i(G).
The determinacy of parity games follows from a far more general game-theoretic result concern-
ing Borel games, due to Martin [16]. The fact that winning strategies in parity games can always be
taken to be history free, was independently proved in Mostowski [18] and Emerson and Jutla [8].
3. Automata on inﬁnite objects
In this section, we intend to supply a gentle introduction to our general deﬁnition of an automa-
ton operating on coalgebras, by discussing the shape of some ﬁnite automata that are well known
from the literature. While we subsequently increase the (conceptual) complexity of these machines,
their overall shape will be ﬁxed as a quadruple  = (A, aI ,,Acc), with A some ﬁnite set of objects
called states, aI ∈ A the initial state, some kind of transition function, andAcc ⊆ Aω the acceptance
condition.
There are in fact quite a few dimensions along which one may classify such automata. For in-
stance, an important criterion, and one that we will encounter here as well, concerns the ﬂavor of
the transition function; this ﬂavor makes whether we call the automaton deterministic, non-deter-
ministic, or alternating. A second useful criterion is based on the acceptance condition of the device;
examples include the Büchi condition, and the parity condition that we will focus on in this paper.
However, both of these criteria are fairly orthogonal to the aim of this paper. Our purpose here
is to start with a classiﬁcation of ﬁnite automata according to the kind of object on which the device
operates (words, trees, or graphs). We hope that our presentation will convince the reader that the
obvious similarities in the deﬁnition of an automaton accepting an object, are essentially coalgebraic
in nature. This naturally leads to the general deﬁnition of an automaton that operates on pointed
coalgebras of type F, where F is an arbitrary R-standard endofunctor on Set.
Let us ﬁrst ﬁx some terminology and notation. Throughout this section, we will work with a ﬁxed
alphabet, or color set, C .
Deﬁnition 3.1. Let F be an endofunctor on the category Set, and C an arbitrary ﬁnite set of ob-
jects that we shall call colors. We let FC denote the functor FCS = C × FS; that is, FC maps a set
S to the set C × FS (and a function f : S → S ′ to the function idC × Ff : C × FS → C × FS ′).
FC-coalgebras will also be called C-colored F-coalgebras.
We will usually denote FC-coalgebras as triples  = (S , % , ), with % : S → C the coloring and
 : S → FS the F-coalgebra map.
Inﬁnite words over an alphabet & can thus be seen as (special) Id&-coalgebras, where Id is the
identity functor on Set. Likewise, inﬁnite&-labeled binary trees are special coalgebras for the func-
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tor (Id× Id)&. The third and last kind of objects for which we will consider ﬁnite automata in this
section are the C-colored coalgebras for the power set functor P . Recall that there are plenty of
examples of P-coalgebras in the literature, since any binary relation R ⊆ S × S can be presented as
the P-coalgebra map sending a point s ∈ S to the collection {t ∈ S | (s, t) ∈ R} of its R-successors.
As particular examples we mention graphs and Kripke frames; Kripke models, say, over a collec-
tion Prop of proposition letters, can be seen as Kripke frames that are colored by the collection of
subsets of Prop.
The process of an automaton traversing and scanning a coalgebra structure needs a starting
point: the ﬁrst letter of a word, the root of a tree. In general, it is pointed coalgebras (see Section 2.1)
rather than coalgebras per se that are the objects of investigation for our automata.
3.1. Automata on inﬁnite words
To start with, consider simple automata operating on inﬁnite words. In the deterministic ﬂavor,
these are objects  = (A, aI , (,Acc) where the transition function is of the form
( : A× C → A.
If we let such a device operate on an inﬁnite C-word % = c0c1c2 . . ., the result is a so-called run, that
is, a sequence * = a0a1a2 . . . such that a0 = aI and ai+1 = ((ai, ci) for all i ∈ ω. Now  is deﬁned to
accept % if and only if this run, which is uniquely determined by  and % , belongs to the set Acc.
(In the case of a standard ﬁnite automaton, the acceptance condition is given by a subset F ⊆ A of
ﬁnal, or more appropriately, accepting states. An inﬁnite word is accepted by such a machine if at
least one of these accepting states occurs inﬁnitely often in the run. This relatively simple concept
is called Büchi acceptance.)
In the non-deterministic variant of a word automaton, we are dealing with a transition function
 : A× C → PA.
Runs of such machines are no longer uniquely determined: a run of  on an inﬁnite word % =
c0c1c2 . . . may be any ω-word * = a0a1a2 . . . over A satisfying a0 = aI and ai+1 ∈ (ai, ci) for all
i ∈ ω.  accepts % if at least one of these runs meets the acceptance condition. A good way to envis-
age this is to think of the automaton traversing % and at each time choosing a new state ai+1 from
the set (ai, ci).
It is completely straightforward to generalize these notions from inﬁnitewords overC to arbitrary
IdC-coalgebras. For instance, in the non-deterministic variant, a run of  on a IdC-coalgebra  =
(S , % , ) starting at s ∈ S is an ω-word * = a0a1a2 . . . such that a0 = aI and ai+1 ∈ (ai, %(i(s))). 
accepts (, s) if one of these runs is accepting.
3.2. Automata on binary trees
Changing the type of the coalgebra functor, we move on to automata that operate on C-la-
beled binary trees (or on arbitrary structures that can be represented as coalgebras for the functor
(Id× Id)&). The basic new idea here is that an automaton which scans such a structure, starting at
the root of the tree, at each node splits into two copies, each of which continues the investigation
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of the tree at one of the two successors of the current node. Formally, we denote a binary tree as
a structure  = (2∗, %), where 2∗ denotes the set of ﬁnite words over the alphabet 2 = {0, 1} and
% : 2∗ → C is the coloring of the tree. A (deterministic) tree automaton  = (A, aI , (,Acc) has a
transition function
( : A× C → A× A.
A run of such an automaton on a C-labeled binary tree  = (2∗, %) is now an A-labeled binary tree
* = (2∗,L : 2∗ → A) such that for all nodes s ∈ 2∗, (L(s0),L(s1)) = ((L(s), %(s)). The automaton is
deﬁned to accept the tree  if each path of the run *, seen as an inﬁnite word over A, belongs to A.
Deterministic tree automata, just like deterministic word automata, have a unique run on each
input tree. And similarly as for word automata, we obtain a non-deterministic variant by taking, as
the transition map of the automaton, a function
 : A× C → P(A× A).
Acceptance for such automata may again be formulated in terms of the existence of an accepting
run, where an accepting run is now deﬁned as an A-labeled binary tree * satisfying (L(s0),L(s1)) ∈
((L(s), %(s)) for every node s ∈ 2∗. It is more convenient however, to rephrase the deﬁnition of ac-
ceptance within the framework of game theory. The combination of the existential (‘for some run
. . .’) and universal quantiﬁcation (‘for all paths . . .’) can be explained quite naturally in terms of
the interaction of two players.
With any tree automaton  and tree  we associate an acceptance game G(,), which has two
players, ∃ (Eloise) and ∀ (Abélard). For an intuitive understanding of this game, think of ∃ as aiming
for the automaton to accept the tree, and of ∀ as trying to prevent this. Basically, a position of the
game is a pair (a, s) ∈ A× 2∗, which codes the situation of the automaton being in state a, inspecting
node s of the tree. In such a position, ∃ chooses a pair (a0, a1) ∈ (a, %(s)), after which ∀ chooses
to move either left or right, thus determining the next node of the tree to be either s0 or s1, and
the next state of the automaton to be either a0 or a1. Any full match of the game thus provides
an inﬁnite sequence  = a0a1a2 . . . of states in  (with a0 = aI ), which in its turn determines the
winner of the match: it is ∃ if  ∈ Acc, and ∀ otherwise. The automaton accepts the tree  in case
∃ has a winning strategy for the associated game initiated at the pair (aI , ,), where , is the root of
the tree.
Formally, we may represent this game as the graph game (see Section 2.2) of which the game
positions are given in the following table, and the acceptance condition is given as before.
Position: b P(b) Admissible moves: E[b]
(a, s) ∈ A× 2∗ ∃ {(, s) ∈ P(A× A)× 2∗ |  ∈ (a, %(s))}
((a0, a1), s) ∈ P(A× A)× 2∗ ∀ {(a0, s0), (a1, s1)}
This game theoretic perspective on acceptance opens up variousways to generalize the notion of a
tree automaton.A standardway to do so proceeds as follows. First, read the pair (a0, a1) ∈ (a, %(s))
as a conjunction of the statements ‘go left, and switch to state a0’, and ‘go right, and switch to state
a1’. Abbreviate this as L:a0 ∧ R:a1. Similarly, read the set (a, c) = {(ai0, ai1) | i ∈ I} disjunctively,
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that is, as the formula
∨
i(L:ai0 ∧ R:ai1). The concept of alternation then naturally arises if we allow
arbitrary conjunctions and disjunctions over the set LRA := {L:a,R:a | a ∈ A} in the range of the
transition function of the automaton. That is, we let the transition function be of the form
 : A× C → DL(LRA),
where, for any set X , we let DL(X) denote the set of (distributive) lattice terms over X , that is, the





ﬁnite set P of objects in DL(X). The board of this graph game looks as follows.
Position: b P(b) Admissible moves: E[b]
(a, s) ∈ A× S – {(a, %(s))}
(
∨
P , s) ∈ DL(A× A)× S ∃ {(p , s) ∈ DL(A× A)× S | p ∈ P }
(
∧
P , s) ∈ DL(A× A)× S ∀ {(p , s) ∈ DL(A× A)× S | p ∈ P }
(L:a, s) ∈ LRA × S – {(a, s0)}
(R:a, s) ∈ LRA × S – {(a, s1)}
Note that in the cases where we do not associate a player with a position, the next position of the
game is uniquely determined by the current one, and thus it does not matter which player owns
this position. Special attention is needed for positions of the form (
∨
P , s) and (
∧
P , s) in case P
is the empty set. In a position (
∨
∅, s), ∃ gets stuck since there is no move available for her. Thus,
in accordance with the deﬁnition of parity games, ∃ immediately loses the match. Intuitively, this
is correct since the disjunction over an empty set of propositions is usually taken to be the falsum
formula ⊥. Likewise, ∀ loses any match ending at a position of the form (∧∅, s), which is in ac-
cordance with the convention that
∧
∅ is equivalent to the formula . In any case, it is important
to note that in the acceptance game for alternating tree automata, full matches may be ﬁnite. The
winner and loser of an inﬁnite match are provided by the acceptance condition of the automaton.
Given an inﬁnite match , consider the inﬁnite sequence of ‘basic’ positions (a0, s0)(a1, s1)(a2, s2) . . .
occurring in . The match  is won by ∃ if the induced inﬁnite word a0a1a2 . . . belongs to Acc, and
by ∀, otherwise.
For our purposes however, it is more convenient to deﬁne the notion of an alternating tree au-
tomaton in a slightly different (but equivalent) way. We require the transition function to be of the
form
 : A× C → DL(A× A),
with the board of the acceptance game looking as follows.
Position: b P(b) Admissible moves: E[b]
(a, s) ∈ A× S – {(a, %(s))}
(
∨
P , s) ∈ DL(A× A)× S ∃ {(p , s) ∈ DL(A× A)× S | p ∈ P }
(
∧
P , s) ∈ DL(A× A)× S ∀ {(p , s) ∈ DL(A× A)× S | p ∈ P }
((a0, a1), s) ∈ (A× A)× S ∀ {(a0, s0), (a1, s1)}
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To seewhy these twoapproaches are equivalent, recall that the pair (a0, a1) ∈ A× A canbe represent-
ed as the conjunction L:a0 ∧ R:a1. In the other direction, the atomic formula L:a can be represented
by the pair (a, a) where a is a special ‘true’ state, that is, it has (a, c) = {∅} for all colors c.




) apply to this kind of game, in
the sense that replacing a position (ϕ, s) with (ϕ′, s), in case ϕ and ϕ′ are propositionally equivalent
formulas, makes no essential change to the game. From this it follows that instead of allowing
arbitrary formulas as the value of the transition function, we may conﬁne ourselves to formulas
in disjunctive normal form. This enables the following set-theoretic, ‘logic-free’, presentation of
alternating tree automata, namely, in which the transition map has the form
 : A× C → PP(FA),
where F denotes the functor Id× Id. Under this deﬁnition of the automaton we may present the
board of the acceptance game as in the table below. Here we have also made the amendments
necessary to enable the automaton to operate on arbitrary (Id× Id)C-coalgebras.
Position: b P(b) Admissible moves: E[b]
(a, s) ∈ A× S ∃ {(/, s) ∈ P(FA)× S | / ∈ (a)}
(/, s) ∈ P(FA)× S ∀ {(, 0) ∈ FA× FS |  ∈ / and 0 = (s)}
((a0, a1), (s0, s1)) ∈ FA× FS ∀ {(a0, s0), (a1, s1)}
3.3. Automata on graphs/amorphous trees
The last kind of objects for which we consider ﬁnite automata are the C-colored coalgebras for
the power set functor P . It is important to realize that P-coalgebras differ from coalgebras for
the functor Idk (which sends a set X to its k-ary Cartesian power) in one important aspect. In a
P-coalgebra, the collection of successors of a point s is amorphous in the sense that one does not
have explicit access to the individual points of this set. This means that whereas it is completely
trivial to modify the deﬁnition of binary tree automata to the case of k-ary trees, some new ideas
are required to extend the deﬁnition to capture automata for amorphous trees.
There is in fact more than one way to go here. Probably themost intuitive solution generalizes the
ﬁrst-mentioned approach towards alternation for tree automata, i.e., the one in which the transition
function takes values in the set of lattice expressions over the setLRA of ‘atomic formulas.’ Think of
the atomic formula L:a as amodal expression stating that a applies to the L-successor of the current
node of the tree. In the case of the power set functor P , without explicit reference to individual
successors, one may use the formulas ♦a and a as the basic building blocks of the distributive
lattice expressions. The meaning of these formulas would then be to send a copy of the automaton,
switched to state a, to some successor of the current point of the graph or tree. Here the difference
is of course that in the case of a diamond formula ♦a, this successor is chosen by ∃, while it is ∀
who chooses the next node in the case of a box formula a. Thus, the net effect is that in the case
of a diamond formula, a single copy of the automaton is sent out to one successor of the current
point in the tree, whereas in the case of a box formula, a copy of the automaton is moving to each
successor node.
648 Y. Venema / Information and Computation 204 (2006) 637–678
The perspective on graph automata that we discuss now is equivalent but different. Our approach
roughly follows Janin and Walukiewicz [12], but we have streamlined the presentation quite a bit
to bring out the coalgebraic aspect of the deﬁnition more clearly. This facilitates the generalization
towards arbitrary coalgebras.
The basic idea of this second approach is to use sets of states of  as ‘descriptions’ of sets of
nodes of the colored graph  under inspection. Such a ‘description’, say, by a set B ⊆ A of a set
T ⊆ S , needs to be substantiated by a relation Z ⊆ A× S which is full on B and T , in the sense that
for every b ∈ B there is a t ∈ T such that (b, t) ∈ Z , and for every t ∈ T there is a b ∈ B such that
(b, t) ∈ Z .
In the case of a deterministic automaton then, we may simply take the transition map to be of
the form
( : A× C → PA,
and the idea is that when the automaton, in state a ∈ A, inspects a node s ∈ S , the set ((a, %(s))
provides a description of the collection (s) of successors of s. (Recall that we use % to denote the
coloring of the graph.) It is the task of ∃ to come up with a full relation Z ⊆ ((a,>∼ (s))× (s) to
substantiate the claim that ((a,>∼ (s)) is an adequate description of (s). After she has chosen such
a relation Z , it is ∀’s turn to pick a pair (b, t) ∈ Z . The automaton then switches to state b and moves
to successor t of s, and the acceptance game continues. Thus, different from the case of bounded
trees, here even the acceptance game associated with a deterministic automaton may witness some
nontrivial interaction between the two players.
In passing we note that the equivalence of both approaches can be seen quite easily in terms of
coalgebraic modal logic. For, our notion of a set P ⊆ A ‘describing’ the set (s) of successors of s,
can be very succinctly formulated by the formula
∇P := 
∨
{p | p ∈ P } ∧
∧
{p | p ∈ P } (2)
holding at s. And conversely, the standardmodal operators can be expressed using the∇ operation:
ϕ ≡ ∇{,ϕ} and ϕ ≡ ∇∅ ∨ ∇{ϕ}. Thus, at least in the cases where we have conjunctions and
disjunctions at our disposal, we may freely switch between ∇ on the one hand, and  and  on the
other.
Given the above description of the deterministic graph automata, it is straightforward to come
up with the deﬁnition of its nondeterministic and alternating variants. Concerning the latter, one
could deﬁne the transition function of an alternating automaton to take values in the setDL(PA)
of lattice expressions over the set PA, but it seems cleaner to take the equivalent set-theoretic for-
mulation that is based on the disjunctive normal form of such expressions. That is, the transition
function of an alternating graph automaton has the form
 : A× C → PPPA.
The triple occurrence of the power set operation may seem rather confusing at ﬁrst sight. Probably
the best way to understand this feature is by recalling that there is one P for ∃, one for ∀, and one
for the functor. A better way to type this transition function is as
 : A× C → PPFA.
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Formally, the acceptance game of such an automaton is played on the following graph:
Position: b P(b) Admissible moves: E[b]
(a, s) ∈ A× S ∃ {(/, s) ∈ P(FA)× S | / ∈ (a,>∼ (s))}
(/, s) ∈ P(FA)× S ∀ {(, 0) ∈ FA× FS |  ∈ / and 0 = (s)}
(, 0) ∈ FA× FS ∃ {Z ∈ P(A× S) | Z is full on (, 0)}
Z ∈ P(A× S) ∀ Z
As always, the winning conditions of the game are completely determined by the acceptance con-
dition Acc of the automaton. That is, each match of the game induces, in the most obvious way, a
sequence of states of the automaton, and (at least, in case we are talking about an inﬁnite match),
the winner of the match is ∃ if this sequence belongs to Acc, and ∀ otherwise.
3.4. A coalgebraic perspective
Our presentation of graph automata has provided almost all of the ingredients needed for gen-
eralizing the deﬁnition of an automaton to a general, coalgebraic level. The key observation still
to be made is that our fairly vague story of a subset P ⊆ A ‘describing’ the set (s) ∈ PS is in fact
an instance of the coalgebraic notion of relation lifting (see Section 2.1). More precisely, a relation
Z ⊆ A× S is full on P ⊆ A and T ⊆ S if and only if the pair (P , T) ∈ FA× FS belongs to the relation
lifting FZ .
Also in the cases of word and tree automata, it is relation lifting that determines how a match
of the game proceeds. In these cases however, there is no real choice for ∃ when it comes to the
‘witnessing relation’ Z . For instance, given ((a0, a1), (s0, s1)) ∈ FA× FS , where F is the binary tree
functor Id× Id, a relation Z ⊆ FA× FS satisﬁes ((a0, a1), (s0, s1)) ∈ FZ if and only if Z contains both
(a0, s0) and (a1, s1). But since ∃will always choose the witnessing relation Z as small as possible, this
means that without loss of generality we may assume that she picks exactly the set {(a0, s0), (a1, s1)},
and thus effectively, has no choice at all. The reader is invited to check how this is reﬂected in the
deﬁnition of the acceptance game of tree automata.
Thus, we have arrived at a natural notion of an automaton operating on pointed FC-coalge-
bras—at least, for any functor F for which relation lifting ‘works.’ In the deterministic case, the
transition function could be deﬁned to be of the form
( : A× C → FA.
The acceptance game for such an automaton operating on anFC-coalgebra = (S ,>∼: S → C ,  :
S → FS) is given by the following table:
Position: b P(b) Admissible moves: E[b]
(a, s) ∈ A× S ∃ {Z ∈ P(A× S) | (((a,>∼ (s)), (s)) ∈ FZ}
Z ∈ P(A× S) ∀ Z
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In the acceptance game for the alternating version of such an automaton, the players ﬁrst play, at
a position (a, s) ∈ A× S , a little ‘subgame’ to arrive at a position (, (s)) ∈ FA× FS . From there,
play proceeds as in the deterministic version. In general, it is interesting to observe that the alternat-
ing game proceeds in rounds, and that each round witnesses two fairly different kinds of interaction
between ∃ and ∀.
Finally, it turns out that we can simplify our discussion somewhat by disposing of the colors. In
the following section, we develop a framework of F-automata as devices for inspecting coalgebras
based on an arbitrary functor, rather than colored coalgebras only. This enables us to work with
transition functions that are of the form
 : A→ PPFA.
Obviously, this theory applies to functors of the form FC as well, and, hence, it does provide us with




The following deﬁnition concerns the most important notion of the paper: F-automata.
Deﬁnition 4.1. Let F be an R-standard endofunctor on Set. An (alternating) F-automaton is a qua-
druple  = (A, aI ,,Acc), with A some ﬁnite set of objects called states, aI ∈ A the initial state,
 : A→ PPFA the transition function, and Acc ⊆ Aω the acceptance condition.
An F-automaton is called non-deterministic if all members of each (a) are singletons. An
F-automaton is called deterministic if for each a ∈ A there is an element ((a) ∈ FA such that
(a) = {{((a)}} (in particular, such an automaton is non-deterministic).
Themeaning of this deﬁnition should become clear belowwhenwe discuss the acceptance games.
In the sequel we may drop the adjective ‘alternating’ when referring to such an automaton: in our
terminology, the generic automaton is alternating, and deterministic and non-deterministic auto-
mata are special instances of alternating ones.
There are various kinds of acceptance conditions known from the literature. For almost all of
these, the criterion, whether an inﬁnite sequence  ∈ Aω belongs Acc or not, is formulated in terms
of the set Inf (). For instance, a Büchi condition puts  ∈ Acc if and only if Inf () contains at least
one of a set of special acceptance states. In the remainder of this paper we will work exclusively
with parity automata.
Deﬁnition 4.2.LetF be anR-standard endofunctor onSet. A parityF-automaton is anF-automaton
 = (A, aI ,,Acc), such thatAcc = Aω for some paritymap : A→ ω, see (1). Such an automaton
is usually presented as  = (A, aI ,, ). The map  is called the parity function of the automaton.
4.2. Acceptance game
F-automata are supposed to operate on pointed F-coalgebras. Basically, the idea is that an
F-automaton will either accept or reject a given pointed F-coalgebra. The best way to express the
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evaluation process leading to either acceptance or rejection, is in terms of a two-player inﬁnite graph
game, or brieﬂy: graph game, see Section 2. It is useful to ﬁrst consider the following coalgebraic
example of a graph game.
Example 4.3. There are various ways to put the notion of bisimulation into this game-theoretic
framework. At this stage it is instructive to consider the following approach from Baltag [3].
Let  = (S , ) and ′ = (S ′, ′) be two F-coalgebras for some endofunctor F on Set which pre-
serves weak pullbacks. The bisimulation game B(,′) between  and ′ is deﬁned as the graph
game (B∃,B∀,E,Ref ) with B∃ := S × S ′, B∀ := P(S × S ′), Ref := Bω (i.e., all inﬁnite matches are
winning for ∃), while the edge relation E is given as follows:
• in position (s, s′), ∃ may choose any set Z ⊆ S × S ′ satisfying ((s), ′(s′)) ∈ FZ ;
• in position Z ⊆ S × S ′, ∀ may choose any element (t, t′) of Z .
We leave it to the reader to verify that
(s, s′) ∈Win ∃(B) iff , s↔ ′, s′.
The key observation for the direction from left to right is that the relation Win ∃(B) itself is a bi-
simulation between  and ′. For the other direction, let ∃ choose, at an arbitrary position (t, t′),
any bisimulation between  and ′ that links t to t′, cf. Fact 1(3).
Deﬁnition 4.4. Let  = (A, aI ,, ) be an F-automaton, and let  = (S , ) be an F-coalgebra. The
acceptance game G(,) associated with  and  is the parity graph game (B∃,B∀,E, ) with
B∃ := A× S ∪ FA× FS
B∀ := P(FA)× S ∪ P(A× S).
(For the sake of a smooth presentation, we will occasionally represent a position of the form
(, (s)) ∈ FA× FS as (, s) ∈ FA× S .)
The edge relation E and the parity map  of the game are given by the table below:
Position: b P(b) Admissible moves: E[b]  (b)
(a, s) ∈ A× S ∃ {(/, s) ∈ P(FA)× S | / ∈ (a)}  (a)
(/, s) ∈ P(FA)× S ∀ {(, 0) ∈ FA× FS |  ∈ / and 0 = (s)} 0
(, 0) ∈ FA× FS ∃ {Z ∈ P(A× S) | (, 0) ∈ FZ} 0
Z ∈ P(A× S) ∀ Z 0
Finally,  accepts the pointed F-coalgebra (, s) if (aI , s) is a winning position for ∃ in the game
G(,).
To get an understanding of this game, consider an F-automaton  and an F-coalgebra . Of all
the positions in the game G = G(,), those in A× S are the basic ones—the other positions are
just intermediate stages. Roughly, one should see a pair (a, s) ∈ A× S as a situation in which the
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automaton is in state a, inspecting the point s of the coalgebra. The aim of ∃ is to show that this
description ‘ﬁts’; while the aim of ∀ is to convince her that this is not the case. Going into detail we
ﬁrst look at two special cases.
First suppose that the automaton  is deterministic. That is, there is a map ( : A→ FA
such that (a) = {{((a)}} for each a ∈ A. Now at any position (a, s) ∈ A× S of the game G, ∃
can only make one move, namely, to the position {(((a), s)} ∈ P(FA)× S; after that, ∀ has no
choice either: he has to move the pebble to (((a), (s)) ∈ FA× FS . Note that this position is
completely determined by the ﬁrst position—hence the name ‘deterministic.’ A position of the
form (((a), (s)) is like the position (a, s) of the bisimulation game of Example 4.3: ∃ chooses
a relation Z ⊆ A× S such that (((a), (s)) ∈ FZ , after that, ∀ chooses a new pair (b, t) ∈ Z ,
and we are back in one of the basic positions. So in the deterministic case, a parity au-
tomaton itself can be represented as a ‘decorated’ F-coalgebra: apart from an initial state it
also carries an acceptance condition  : A→ ω. Likewise, the acceptance game G(,) for
such an automaton is like a ‘decorated’ bisimulation game. Note however, that much of the
power of automata working on inﬁnite objects precisely stems from the intricacies of these
‘decorations.’
Now take the more general case in which we only know that  is non-deterministic, and con-
sider a position (a, s) ∈ A× S . Here ∃ has a real choice: she can pick any singleton {} from
(a) and move the pebble to position {(, s)} ∈ P(FA× S). After that, ∀s choice is forced: he
must move the pebble to position (, (s)) ∈ FA× FS . Effectively then, at position (a, s) it is ∃
on her own who determines the later position (, (s)) ∈ FA× FS . Note that at positions of the
form (, (s)) ∈ FA× FS the game proceeds as in the deterministic case, until another central
position is reached.
Finally, we consider the most general case, in which  is an arbitrary automaton. Here it is still
the aim to arrive, starting from a position (a, s) ∈ A× S , at a position (, (s)) ∈ FA× FS , but now
∃ and ∀ play a little ‘subgame’ to get there. In the version presented here, ﬁrst ∃makes a preselection,
that is, she chooses some subset / ⊂ FA; then ∀ picks an element  ∈ /, and the new position is
(, (s)); from here, play proceeds as before. Note that any match of the game is over as soon as
the responsible player gets stuck, in the sense that (s)he reaches a position in which no moves are
admissible. This happens for instance in a position (a, s) such that (a, s) = ∅; in this case ∃ gets
stuck and immediately looses the match. Likewise, if ∃ can choose ∅ ∈ (a, s) then she wins the
match since ∀ will get stuck in the next move.
For future use as a measure of the complexity of an F-automaton, we now deﬁne the index of
an automaton, and some auxiliary notions. Recall that for an element  ∈ FA, where A is ﬁnite, we
deﬁne Base () as the smallest subset A0 ⊆ A such that  ∈ FA0.
Deﬁnition 4.5. Given an R-standard set functor F, let  = (A, aI ,, ) be some F-automaton.
The relation → is deﬁned by putting a→ b if b ∈ Base () for some  ∈ FA that occurs in
(a).
It will be intuitively clear that in an acceptance game G(,), at a position of the form (, (s)) ∈
FA× FS , ∃ will choose the relation Z ⊆ A× S as small as possible. But the set Base () has the
property that if (, (s)) ∈ FZ , then (, (s)) already belongs to the setF(Z ∩ (Base ()× S)). Hence
we may always assume without loss of generality that Z ⊆ Base ()× S . From this we may con-
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clude that two subsequent basic positions (a, s) and (b, t) in any acceptance game will be such that
a→ b.
Deﬁnition 4.6.LetFbe someR-standard set functor, andconsider anF-automaton = (A, aI ,, ).
We will call a subset C of A strongly connected if for every c and d in C there is a path c = c0 →
c1 → . . .→ cn = d in C . Now the index of  is deﬁned as
ind () := max{#( [C]) | C a strongly connected component of },
that is, ind () is the maximal number of distinct parities reached by the elements of a strongly
connected component of .
4.3. Some basic results
To obtain some familiarity with the notion of an F-automaton, let us start with discussing two
basic results. First, we prove that acceptance is bisimulation invariant.
Proposition 4.7. Let F be some R-standard endofunctor on Set, let  be some F-automaton, and let
 = (S , ) and ′ = (S ′, ′) be two F-coalgebras. Then for any pair of bisimilar states s in  and s′ in
′, accepts (, s) iff it accepts (′, s′).
Proof. Let B ⊆ S × S ′ be a bisimulation containing the pair (s0, s′0) ∈ S × S ′, and assume that
 = (A, aI ,, ) accepts (, s0). We will prove that  then also accepts (′, s′0).
To see why this is so, consider a match of the game G′ = G(,′) that starts at the position
(aI , s′0). Since by assumption, the position (aI , s0) in the game G = G(,) is winning for ∃, it
holds in particular that (aI ) /= ∅—otherwise, ∃ would have lost immediately. Suppose that in
G, ∃ would choose the position (/, s0) ∈ P(FA)× S , then in G′ her choice at position (aI , s′0)
will be (/, s′0).
Now if we have / = ∅, then she wins the match immediately, in which case we are done. So
suppose otherwise, then ∀ chooses an element  ∈ /, so that the next position in the G′-match is
(, s′0). Now suppose that in the corresponding G-position (, s0), ∃’s move would be some relation
Z ⊆ A× S . We claim that in the corresponding G′-match, the relation Z ′ := Z ◦ B is a legitimate
move for ∃ at (, ′(s′0)), that is, we have (, ′(s′0)) ∈ FZ ′. To seewhy this is so, observe that it follows
from the legitimacy of Z as a move in G at (, s0), that (, (s0)) ∈ FZ , and from the fact that B is
a bisimulation with (s0, s′0) ∈ B, that ((s0), ′(s′0)) ∈ FB. But then we have (, ′(s′0)) ∈ FZ ◦ FB =
F(Z ◦ B) = FZ ′, as required.
Toﬁnish theﬁrst roundof the game, suppose that at thepositionZ ′ ofG′,∀picks apair (a1, s′1) ∈ Z ′.
Then by deﬁnition, there is a point s1 in  such that (a1, s1) ∈ Z and (s1, s′1) ∈ B.
Continuing in this fashion, we see that ∃ obtains her strategy in G′ from playing a shadow match
of G. The relation between anymatch ′ of G′ in which ∃ follows this strategy, and the corresponding
shadow match  of G, is that at every stage k of the match, the kth positions pk of G and p ′k of G′
satisfy one of the following conditions:
(1) pk is of the form (x, s) and p ′k is of the form (x, s′), with (s, s′) ∈ B (and x belonging to either A,P(FA) or FA), or
(2) pk is some relation Z ⊆ A× S , and p ′k is the relation Z ◦ B.
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But then it follows immediately from the deﬁnitions that the winners of the two matches must be
identical. And so, from our assumption that  accepts (, s0), it follows that it also
accepts (′, s′0). 
In fact, we may prove something of a converse to this result, at least for ﬁnite coalgebras. (Our
result could be extended to arbitrary coalgebras if we would allow automata to be inﬁnite.) That is,
with every ﬁnite pointed F-coalgebra (, s) we may associate an automaton ,s that characterizes
(, s) modulo bisimulation. This automaton is in fact the structure (, s) itself, dressed up as a
deterministic F-automaton (cf. the discussion following Deﬁnition 4.4).
Deﬁnition 4.8.Let F be some R-standard endofunctor on Set. Given a ﬁnite F-coalgebra  =
(S , ), and a point s in , deﬁne the F-automaton ,s as the structure ,s = (S , s, , 0),
where  and  0 are given by putting (t) := {{(t)}}, and  0(t) := 0, for every point
t ∈ S .
Proposition 4.9. Let F be some R-standard endofunctor on Set, and let (, s) be some ﬁnite pointed
F-coalgebra. Then for any pointed coalgebra (′, s′), it holds that
,s accepts (
′, s′) iff , s↔ ′, s′.
Proof. It is immediate from the deﬁnitions that for every pointed coalgebra (′, s′), the evalua-
tion game G(,s,′), initialized at (s, s′), is essentially the same as Baltag’s bisimulation game, see
Example 4.3. From this, the proposition follows immediately. 
4.4. Variation: chromatic F-automata
Familiar automata, such as the ones discussed in Section 3, operate on coalgebras that are
colored by some set C , and have a transition function  taking input from the set A× C
(with A the state set of the automaton). Now obviously, our deﬁnition 4.1, when applied
to a functor of the form FC , does provide automata that will scan C-colored F-coalgebras,
but the reader may worry that their transition function  : A→ PP(C × FA) has the wrong
shape since it seems to take input only from A. In this section, we will show that the no-
tion of an F-automaton is ﬂexible enough to encode the technicalities involving colors, so
that we may work in the simpler framework without making concessions to its scope of
applicability.
Let us ﬁrst introduce a coalgebraic generalization of the notion of automaton that
seems to be more in line with standard usage in automata theory. As before, we
represent FC-coalgebras as triples of the form  = (S ,>∼, ) with >∼: S → C and  :
S → FS .
Deﬁnition 4.10. Let F be an R-standard endofunctor on Set. A chromatic F-automaton over C
is a quintuple  = (A, aI ,C ,, ) such that  : A× C → PPFA (and A, aI , and  are as
before).
Given such an automaton and an FC-coalgebra  = (S ,>∼, ), we deﬁne the acceptance game
GC(,) in a very similar way as before, witnessed by the following table:
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Position: b P(b) Admissible moves: E[b]  (b)
(a, s) ∈ A× S ∃ {(/, s) ∈ P(FA)× S | / ∈ (a,>∼ (s))}  (a)
(/, s) ∈ P(FA)× S ∀ {(, 0) ∈ FA× FS |  ∈ / and 0 = (s)} 0
(, 0) ∈ FA× FS ∃ {Z ∈ P(A× S) | (, 0) ∈ FZ} 0
Z ∈ P(A× S) ∀ Z 0
We will now show that the differences between the two kinds of automata for recognizing
C-colored F-coalgebras are only superﬁcial. That is, we will provide very simple constructions
for transforming FC-automata into equivalent chromatic F-automata over C , and vice versa.
Deﬁnition 4.11. Let  = (A, aI ,C ,, ) be a chromatic F-automaton over C . We deﬁne its
FC-companion C as the automaton (A, aI ,C , ), with C : A→ PP(C × FA) given by
C(a) := {{c} ×/ | / ∈ (q, c), c ∈ C} .
(Note that if / = {1, . . . , n}, then {c} ×/ is the set {(c, 1), . . . , (c, n)}).
Conversely, given an FC-automaton  = (B, bI ,6,7), the structure (B, bI ,C ,6C ,7) with
6C(b, c) := {/ ∈ PFB | {c} ×/ ∈ 6(b)}.
is called the chromatic F-companion of , notation: C .
The following claim shows that the two kinds of automata for FC-coalgebras are merely variants
of one another.
Proposition 4.12. Let  be a chromatic F-automaton over C , and  an FC-automaton. Then for any
pointed FC-coalgebra (, s) it holds that
 accepts (, s) iff C accepts (, s), (3)
 accepts (, s) iff C accepts (, s). (4)
Proof.We conﬁne our attention to (4). Fix  and . We will show that
Win ∃(G(,)) =Win ∃(GC(C ,)), (5)
which clearly sufﬁces to prove the equivalence of  and C .
For the inclusion ⊇ of (5), note that by Fact 3 we may assume that in GC(C ,), ∃ has a history
free strategy f which is winning from every position inWin ∃(GC(C ,)). Now deﬁne the following
map f ′ on ∃’s positions in the other game, G(,). For (b, s) ∈ B× S , let f−(b, s) denote the unique
element / ∈ P(FA) such that f(b, s) = (/, s), and put
f ′(b, s) := ({%(s)} × f−(b, s), s) ,
f ′(, 0) := f(, 0).
Weﬁrst show thatf ′ is a legitimate strategy for∃on eachof her positions in the setWin ∃(GC(C ,)).
This is obvious for positions of the form (, 0) ∈ FB× FS . For a position (b, s) ∈ B× S , from the
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fact that f−(b, s) ∈ 6C(b, %(s)) and the deﬁnition of 6C , it is immediate that f ′(b, s) belongs to
6(b), as required.
Now consider an arbitrary match  of G(,), initiated at a position p that we know to be
winning in the game GC(C ,), and assume that ∃ plays according to her strategy f ′. It is not hard
to see that with  we may associate a shadow match ′ of GC(C ,) in which ∃ plays according to
her winning strategy f , and such that  and ′ pass through exactly the same basic positions (i.e.,
in A× S). This immediately implies that ∃ wins , and so her strategy f ′ must be winning for her in
G(,). This proves the inclusion ⊇ of (5).
For the other inclusion, let f be a history free winning strategy for ∃ in G(,). The key observa-
tion is that for any position (b, s) ∈Win ∃(G(,)), f(b, s)must be of the form ({c} ×/, s) for some
c ∈ C and/ ∈ FB. From this observation it is completely straightforward to deﬁne a strategy for ∃
in the other game, GC(C ,), and to prove, in analogy of the proof just given, that this strategy is
winning from every position inWin ∃(G(,)).
To prove the key observation, assume that f(b, s) = (8, s) ∈ P(C × FB)× S , and suppose for
contradiction that8 contains elements (c1, 1) and (c2, 2)with c1 /= c2. The point is that this would
always enable ∀ to choose, in the next move, a pair ((ci, i), s) such that ci is distinct from %(s), and
thus provide him with an immediate win of the match. Hence we arrive at the desired contradiction,
since we assumed that f was a winning strategy on (b, s).
This justiﬁes our key observation, and hence, we are done with the proof of (5). 
4.5. Variation: logical automata
A different perspective on the step function  of an F-automaton  is that for all states a, (a)
is a disjunction of conjunctions of elements of FA. This suggests the following generalization. Recall
that, given a set X , DL(X) denotes the set of lattice expressions over X .
Deﬁnition 4.13. Let F be an R-standard endofunctor on Set. A logical F-automaton is a quadruple
 = (A, aI ,, ) with A, aI and  as before, and  : A→ DL(FA).
The acceptance game for this is deﬁned in a completely obvious way, making ∃ choose between
disjuncts, moving from (
∨
P , s) to (p , s) for some p ∈ P , and making ∀ choose between conjuncts,
moving from (
∧
P , s) to a position (p , s) with p ∈ P , until a position (, s) is reached with  ∈ FA.
Play then continues as in the game for the standard automaton.
Position: b P(b) Admissible moves: E[b]  (b)
(a, s) ∈ A× S – {(a)}  (a)
(
∨
P , s) ∈ DL(FA)× S ∃ {(p , s) ∈ DL(FA)× S | p ∈ P } 0
(
∧
P , s) ∈ DL(FA)× S ∀ {(p , s) ∈ DL(FA)× S | p ∈ P } 0
(, s) ∈ FA× S ∃ {Z ∈ P(A× S) | (, (s)) ∈ FZ} 0
Z ∈ P(A× S) ∀ Z 0
This generalization to logical automata is nice and useful, but it does not add any recognizing
power to our automata:
Proposition 4.14. F-automata and logical F-automata recognize the same classes of pointed
F-coalgebras.
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The proposition can be proved using some standard game-theoretical argumentation, see for
instance Muller and Schupp [19, Appendix C]. (Basically, it just involves applying the distributive
laws of disjunction over conjunction, and vice versa).
4.6. Variation: delayed F-automata
The automata of Deﬁnition 4.1 all have the property that in the acceptance game, the play basi-
cally switches from positions in A× S to ones in FA× FS , perhaps with some alternation between∨
/∃ and∧ /∀. For many purposes this is rather restrictive; it would be more convenient to allow
moves from a position (a, s) ∈ A× S to another position (b, s) ∈ A× S withoutmaking a coalgebra-
ic move in between. That is, while the automaton switches state, it would stay in the same point of
the coalgebra. We will call such automata delayed because the move to successors of the coalgebra
point is delayed. Just as in the case of ordinary automata, we can deﬁne the transition function of
a delayed automaton as a map of the form  : A→ PP(A ∪ FA), or we can choose the equivalent
‘logical’ format. For our purposes, the latter formulation is more convenient.
Deﬁnition 4.15. Let F be an R-standard endofunctor on Set. A delayed F-automaton is a quadruple
 = (A, aI ,, ), with A, aI and  as usual, and transition function  : A→ DL(A ∪ FA).
The acceptance game G(,) associated with  and an F-coalgebra  is the parity graph game
given by the following table. (For the sake of a smoother notation, positions of the form (, (s)) ∈
FA× FS are given as (, s) ∈ FA× S .)
Position: b P(b) Admissible moves: E[b]  (b)
(a, s) ∈ A× S – {(a)}  (a)
(
∨
P , s) ∈ DL(A ∪ FA)× S ∃ {(p , s) ∈ DL(A ∪ FA)× S | p ∈ P } 0
(
∧
P , s) ∈ DL(A ∪ FA)× S ∀ {(p , s) ∈ DL(A ∪ FA)× S | p ∈ P } 0
(, s) ∈ FA× S ∃ {Z ∈ P(A× S) | (, (s)) ∈ FZ} 0
Z ∈ P(A× S) ∀ Z 0
Once more, it can be shown that the new type of F-automata has the same expressive power as
the old one.
Proposition 4.16. Delayed F-automata recognize the same classes of coalgebras as ordinary
F-automata.
To prove this proposition, we ﬁrst need some deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 4.17. Let  = (A, aI ,, ) be a delayed F-automaton. We deﬁne the relation $ ⊆ A× A
by putting b $ a if and only if b occurs in (a) (that is, b is an atomic subterm of (a)). We call a
state a ∈ A semi-guarded if (b) >  (a) whenever b $ a, and guarded if there is no b such that b $ a.
An automaton is called semi-guarded (guarded, respectively) if each of its states is semi-guarded
(guarded).
We will now ﬁrst prove that any delayed automaton can be turned into an equivalent semi-
guarded one, and then show that any semi-guarded automaton can be replaced with an equivalent
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guarded one. This sufﬁces to prove the proposition, because clearly, the ordinary F-automata can
be identiﬁed with the guarded delayed ones.
Proposition 4.18. Every delayed F-automaton  is equivalent to a semiguarded F-automaton.
Proof. Fix the delayed automaton  = (A, aI ,, ). Without loss of generality, we may assume
that  is injective. By induction we will show that for all i  −1 we may ﬁnd an automaton
i = (A, aI ,i, ) which is equivalent to  and satisﬁes
 (b) > min( (a), i) for all a ∈ A and for all b $ a. (6)
Clearly then the proposition is proved once i takes the value of the maximum parity of all states
in A.
Since the base case of the induction (i = −1) is immediate by the deﬁnition of parity func-
tions, we move on to the inductive case, for i + 1. By the inductive hypothesis then, we have that
 (b) > min( (a), i) for all a ∈ A and for all b $ a. Now distinguish cases.
If there is no a ∈ A such that  (a) = i + 1, we simply put i+1 := i . In this case i+1 and i are
trivially equivalent, so by the induction hypothesis, i+1 is equivalent to i . It remains to be proved
that i+1 meets the required constraint. Take states a and b in A such that b $ a, and distinguish
further cases. In case (a) < i + 1, then we have min( (a), i) =  (a), so we may read the induction
hypothesis as stating that  (b) >  (a); hence, we see that  (b) > min( (a), i + 1), as required.
In the case that  (a)  i + 1, it follows from the assumption that in fact,  (a) > i + 1. Now the
induction hypothesis implies that  (b) > i, and since  (b) /= i + 1, this gives that  (b) > i + 1 =
min( (a), i + 1), again, as required.
Now suppose that, on the other hand, i + 1 does belong to the range of  . We only consid-
er the case that i + 1 is odd—the case that it is even can be treated in a similar fashion. By our
assumption on  there is in fact a unique state c ∈ A such that  (c) = i + 1. Deﬁne, for any nat-
ural number j, Aj := {a ∈ A |  (a)  j}, then it easily follows from the induction hypothesis that
i(c) ∈ DL(Ai+1 ∪ FA). Due to the validity of the distributive laws in this context, without loss
of generality we may assume that i(c) is of the form (c ∨ (1) ∧ (2, where c does not appear in (1
or (2.
Let ; := (1 ∧ (2, and let, for any ϕ ∈ DL(A ∪ FA), ϕ[;/c] denote the result of uniformly substi-
tuting ; for c in the lattice term ϕ (elements from FA remain untouched under this operation). Now




i(a) if  (a) < i + 1,
; if  (a) = i + 1 (i.e., a = c),
i(a)[;/c] if  (a) > i + 1.
From the fact that i(c) ∈ DL(Ai+1 ∪ FA), and the assumption that c does not occur in (1 and (2,
it follows that ; ∈ DL(Ai+2 ∪ FA). Using the induction hypothesis, it is straigh forward to derive
from this that i+1 satisﬁes (6) for i + 1, whence i+1 is at least of the right format.
It is thus left to prove that i+1 is equivalent to , so by the induction hypothesis it sufﬁces to
show that i+1 is equivalent to i . Fix some F-coalgebra  = (S , ), then we must show, for all
points s0 ∈ S , that
(aI , s0) ∈Win ∃(G(i,)) iff (aI , s0) ∈Win ∃(G(i+1,)). (7)
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For the direction (⇐) of (7), let f be a history free winning strategy for ∃ in Gi+1 := G(i+1,).
To deﬁne a strategy f ′ for her in Gi := G(i,), suppose that play of Gi has arrived at a position
(ϕ, s) with ϕ ∈ DL(A ∪ FA). Let (a, s) be the last basic position that we passed in this match, and
distinguish cases:
If (a)  i + 1 and ϕ /= c ∨ (1, then it is easy to see that (ϕ, s)must be a position of the game Gi+1
as well, so that we may simply deﬁne f ′(ϕ, s) := f(ϕ, s). In this case we say that (ϕ, s) is its own
corresponding position.
If  (a) = i + 1 and ϕ = c ∨ (1, then ∃ chooses f ′(c ∨ (1, s) := ((1, s). In this case, (ϕ, s) has no
corresponding position.
If  (a) > i + 1, then the pair (ϕ[;/c], s) must be a position of Gi+1; since we are dealing with
positions for ∃, ϕmust be a disjunction. Now deﬁne f ′(ϕ, s) := ( [;/c], s), where is the disjunct
of ϕ given by f(ϕ, s) = ( , s). Also, call (ϕ[;/c], s) the corresponding position, in Gi+1, of (ϕ, s).
Now consider an arbitrary match  of Gi, starting from (aI , s0), and such that ∃ plays according to
the strategy described above. It is easy to see that if we (i) replace every Gi-position in  with its
corresponding Gi+1-position, (ii) erase all positions of the form (c ∨ (1, s), and (iii) leave positions
of the form Z ⊆ A× S untouched, then we obtain an f -conform match ′ of Gi+1. It follows by the
assumption on f that ′ is won by ∃.
Now let k be the highest parity occurring inﬁnitely often in . If k < i + 1, then from a
certain moment on, the matches  and ′ are identical; clearly then,  is also won by ∃.
If k > i + 1, then it is not hard to see that k must also be the highest priority occurring
inﬁnitely often in ′, so that again, ∃ is the winner of . Now suppose for contradiction
that k = i + 1. Since ∃ never chooses c in a position of the form (c ∨ (1, s), we may infer
that positions of the form (c, s) occur inﬁnitely often in  because of being chosen by ∀ as
elements of a position Zk ⊆ A× S , and that among all positions for which this holds, these
are the ones with the highest parity. But then by deﬁnition this must apply to the match
′ as well. From this it is easy to derive that i + 1 is the highest parity occurring inﬁnite-
ly often in ′. This provides the desired contradiction with the assumption on f , and thus
proves that k /= i + 1.
It follows that in all cases, ∃ wins , and since  was arbitrary, we have proved that (aI , s0) is
a winning position for ∃. This proves the direction (⇐) of (7); we omit the proof for the other
direction, which is similar. 
Proposition 4.19. Every semiguarded F-automata is equivalent to a guarded F-automaton.
Proof. Let  = (A, aI ,, ) be a delayed F-automaton that is semiguarded. For the deﬁnition of its
guarded equivalent ′, we need some preparations.
For each state a ∈ A, we will construct, in ﬁnitely many steps, a tree T(a), together with a label-
ling and a (partial) marking of the nodes of the tree. To set up the construction, we start with the










will be considered as inner nodes also if they have no children.) Fur-
thermore, the root of this tree is marked ‘a’, while no other node of the initial tree is marked. Now
recursively, replace each leaf labelled b ∈ A with its construction tree C(b), and use ‘b’ to mark the
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new inner node of the tree. Repeat the process until no leaves are left that are labelled with elements
of A.
It is not difﬁcult to see that this process must terminate after ﬁnitely many steps. The key obser-
vation here is that for any two states a, b ∈ A, we ﬁnd b as the label of some leaf of C(A) if and only
if b $ a. And since  is semiguarded we have  (b) >  (a) if b $ a. From this it follows that there
are no inﬁnite sequences a0 & a1 & a2 & · · ·, and so the algorithm must terminate.
We deﬁne T(a) as the tree that is constructed by the algorithm that we just described. Clear-
ly, T(a) can be seen as the construction tree of some DL(FA) term ((a). Let Sq$() be the set
of all nonempty sequences a0 . . . an such that an $ an−1 $ · · · $ a0, then with each leaf l of the
ﬁnal tree we may associate, apart from its label l ∈ FA, also a unique sequence l ∈ Sq$(),
consisting of the sequence of marks encountered on the path leading from the root to the
leaf l.
Weare ready for thedeﬁnitionof′. To startwith, for its state setwe take the setA′ := Sq$()× A.
It follows from earlier observations by König’s Lemma that Sq$() is ﬁnite, and so A′ is ﬁnite as
well. (We could obtain a smaller guarded equivalent for , but size considerations are not our wor-
ry here.) For any  ∈ Sq$(), we let * : A→ A′ denote the map given by *(a) := (, a). Now let
T ′(a) be the tree obtained from T(a) by replacing, for each leaf l, the label l ∈ FA with the object
(F*l)(l) ∈ FA′, and let ((a) denote the DL(FA′) term associated with T ′(a). Then we deﬁne the
transition map ′ of ′ by
′(, a) := ((a),
while its parity map  ′ is given by
 ′(a1 . . . an, a) := max{ (ai) | 1  i  n}.
(In fact, it follows from the deﬁnitions that  ′(a1 . . . an, a) =  (an), but this does not play a role in
the sequel.) Finally, we deﬁne
′ := (A′, (aI , aI ),′, ′).
It follows immediately from the deﬁnitions that ′ is a guarded automaton, so it is left to show
that  and ′ are equivalent. For this purpose, ﬁx an arbitrary F-coalgebra  = (S , ). We will
prove that
for all s ∈ S ,  accepts (, s) only if ′ accepts (, s). (8)
(We omit the similar proof that, conversely, accepts every pointed coalgebras that′ accepts.) For
simplicity we assume that all games are inﬁnite; games that might end after ﬁnitely many rounds
can be taken care of by a suitable case distinction.
Before we turn to the proof of (8), ﬁrst consider a basic position ((, a), s) ∈ A′ × S of the game
G′ = G(′,). Deﬁne the static game G′((,a),s) as the (part of) the game G′ that starts at ((, a), s)
and ends when a position (′, s) ∈ FA′ × S is reached. A similar deﬁnition applies to the static game
G(a,s). The crucial observation concerning these games is that the earlier deﬁned tree T(a) repre-
sents the game tree of both these static games, in the sense that the nodes of T(a) labelled with a
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disjunction (conjunction, respectively) represent choice nodes of ∃ (∀, respectively) and that leaves
of T(a) represent positions that mark the end of the static games, etc. Now a strategy of ∃ in either
G′((,a),s) or G(a,s) corresponds to a partial function that maps each disjunctive node of T(a) to one of
its children, and a similar correspondence applies to strategies of ∀. This provides an obvious and
direct way to mimick any strategy, for either player, and in either static game, by a strategy for the
same player, in the other static game.
Now we consider one round of the game G′, starting from the basic position ((, a), s) ∈ A′ × S .
Let f be an arbitrary history free strategy for ∃ in G, and let f ′ be the strategy in G′((,a),s) that mi-
micks (the relevant part of) f . Then with anymatch of G′((,a),s) that is conform f ′, we may associate
a shadow match of G(s,a) that is conform f . The point is that if the G′((,a),s) match ends at a position
((F*aa1...an)(), s) ∈ FA′ × S , then the shadowmatch ends at the position (, s) ∈ FA× S . (In the tree
T(a), both matches correspond to a path passing the inner nodes marked a, a1, …, an.)
Suppose that in G, ∃’s move at the position (, s) is the binary relation Z ⊆ A× S . It follows from
the legitimacy of Z that (, (s)) ∈ FZ . Now deﬁne the relation Z ′ ⊆ A′ × S as follows:
Z ′ := {((, b), t) ∈ A′ × S | (b, t) ∈ Z},
where  abbreviates the sequence  = aa1 . . . an. Putting it differently, we have Z ′ = (Gr(*))˘ ◦ Z .
Using Fact 1, wemay derive that FZ ′ = F(Gr(*))˘ ◦ FZ = (Gr(F*))˘ ◦ FZ . In particular, it follows
from (, (s)) ∈ FZ that ((F*)(), (s)) ∈ FZ ′. In other words, Z ′ is a legitimate move for ∃ at the
position ((F*)(), s). If she chooses, indeed, Z ′ as her next move, ∃ guarantees that any element of
Z ′ that ∀ picks must be of the form ((aa1 . . . an, b), t). That is, the history a, a1, . . . , an has been coded
up in the next basic position ((aa1 . . . an, b), t).
Summarizing, where one round of the G′-match moves from one basic position ((, a), s) to a
next one of the form ((aa1 . . . an, b), t), the shadow match in G started from the basic position (a, s),
passed the basic positions (a1, s), . . . , (an, s), and arrived at the basic position (b, t).
Now assume that ∃ plays an entire match of G′, according to the strategy f ′ just described. Start
from the basic position ((a0,0, a0,0), s0)—here we write a0,0 for the initial state aI of . Suppose that
((a0,0, a0,0), s0)((a0,0a0,1 . . . a0,n0 , a1,0), s1)((a1,0a1,1 . . . a1,n1 , a2,0), s2) . . . (9)
is the sequence of basic positions in an arbitrary match in which ∃ plays f ′. Then it is not hard to
see that
(a0,0, s0)(a0,1, s0) . . . (a0,n0 , s0)(a1,0, s1) . . . (a1,n1 , s1)(a2,0, s2) . . . (10)
is the sequence of basic positions in the associated shadow match in G starting from (a0,0, s0). We
claim that the two matches are won by the same player.
To see why this is so, let Q′ be the set of states from A′ that occur inﬁnitely often in (9), and
likewise with Q and (10). It is straightforward to verify that Q′ can be represented as
Q′ = {(bi,0bi,1 . . . bi,ni , bj,0) | i, j ∈ I}
for some ﬁnite set I , so that it is not so hard to derive that
Q = {bi,k | i ∈ I , 0  k  ni}.
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Now by deﬁnition of  ′ it follows immediately from these characterizations that max{ ′(a′) | a′ ∈
Q′} = max{ (a) | a ∈ Q}, which establishes our claim.
This shows that if  accepts (, s0), then so does ′, and thus ﬁnishes the proof of (the direction
from right to left of) (8). 
5. Coalgebraic ﬁxed point logic
We now turn to the second main topic of the paper, coalgebraic ﬁxed point logic. The formalism
that we are about to deﬁne can be seen as a straightforward extension with ﬁxed point operators
of a natural, ﬁnitary, version of Moss’ coalgebraic logic [17].
5.1. Syntax
Deﬁnition 5.1. Let F be an R-standard endofunctor on Set, and let X be a set of objects to be called
variables. Inductively we deﬁne, for each natural number n, the set LFn (X) of coalgebraic ﬁxed point
formulas over X of depth n:
• LF0 (X) is the smallest set S which contains , ⊥, and all variables in X and satisﬁes (i) if p and
q belong to S , then so do p ∧ q and p ∨ q; and (ii) if p belongs to S , then so do x.p and >x.p , for
each x ∈ X .
• LFn+1(X) is the smallest superset of LFn (X) which contains the formula ∇ for each  that
belongs to FQ for some ﬁnite Q ⊆ LFn (X) and is closed under the same formation rules (i) and
(ii).
The union LF(X) =⋃n∈ω LFn (X) is the set of all coalgebraic ﬁxed point formulas over X .
The set X in LF(X) refers to all variables that may occur in the formulas, not just the free ones
(to be deﬁned later). Quite often we have no reason to make the set X of variables explicit and so
we will frequently write LF rather than LF(X).
Example 5.2. Our deﬁnition is intended to generalize that of the modal -calculus to arbitrary
R-standard endofunctors on Set. Recall that the modal -calculus is a language for coalgebras
for the functor FS = P(Prop)× P(S)Act, where Prop is some set of propositional variables and
Act some set of atomic actions. In the formulation of the modal -calculus of Janin and Wal-
ukiewicz [12], the modal operators 〈a〉 and [a] are replaced with a single connective ‘a→ ·’
operating on ﬁnite sets of formulas: if ? is a ﬁnite set of formulas, then a→ ? is a formu-
la. The meaning of a→ ? can be expressed in terms of 〈a〉 and [a]: a→ ? is equivalent to∧{〈a〉p | p ∈ ?} ∧ [a]∨{p | p ∈ ?}, cf. the ∇-operator from (2). This is of course quite familiar
in coalgebraic logic, and it is not difﬁcult to show that the language of Janin and Walukiewicz
is in fact expressively equivalent to our coalgebraic ﬁxed point logic for this functor, see Ex-
ample 5.16 for more details.
Before we turn to the coalgebraic semantics of this language, there are a number of syntactic
issues to be settled.
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We start with the important observation that every coalgebraic ﬁxed point formula comes with a
unique construction tree; the key insight here is that every formula p has a unique, naturally deﬁned
set of ‘immediate subformulas.’ In case p is of the form ∇ ∈ LFn this insight is based on the fact
that for all ﬁnite sets Q ⊆ LFn and all  ∈ FQ there is a (unique) smallest set Base () ⊆ LFn such
that  ∈ FQ′ (we already mentioned that the existence of such a set easily follows from Fact 2. We
leave it for the reader to give a formal deﬁnition of construction trees; we do provide an explicit
deﬁnition of the notion of subformula.
Deﬁnition 5.3. We will write qp if q is a subformula of p . Inductively we deﬁne the set Sfor(p) of
subformulas of p as follows:
Sfor(p) := {p} if p ∈ {,⊥} ∪ X ,
Sfor(p q) := {p q} ∪ Sfor(p) ∪ Sfor(q) if ∈ {∧,∨},
Sfor(@x.p) := {@x.p} ∪ Sfor(p) if @ ∈ {, >},
Sfor(∇) := {∇} ∪⋃p∈Base () Sfor(p),
where Base () denotes the smallest set Q such that  ∈ FQ; the elements of Base () will be called
the immediate subformulas of ∇.
The following proposition can then be proved by a straightforward induction on the complexity
of formulas.
Proposition 5.4. Every formula p ∈ LF has ﬁnitely many subformulas.
Deﬁnition 5.5. The ﬁxed point operators  and > bind the variable that they occur with, every-
where in the subformula to which they are applied. This notion of binding is fairly standard,
and so are the deﬁnitions of the sets FVar (p) and BVar (p) of free and bound variables, re-
spectively, of a formula p ∈ LF. (For instance, the inductive clause for ∇ reads FVar (∇) :=⋃{FVar (p) | p ∈ Base ()}.) The set Var (p) = FVar (p) ∪ BVar (p) denotes the collection of
all variables occurring in p , free or bound. As in ﬁrst order logic, we will call a formula with-
out free variables, a sentence.
A formula p ∈ LF is called clean if no variable occurs both free and bound in p , and no two
distinct occurrences of ﬁxed point operators bind the same variable. Hence, in a clean formula
p , with each x ∈ BVar (p) we may associate a unique subformula of p where x is bound; we will
denote this formula as @xx.px, and call x a -variable if @x = , and a >-variable if @x = >. A formula
p ∈ LF is called guarded if every subformula @x.q of p has the property that all occurrences of x
inside q are within the scope of a ∇ .
Now let p be a clean formula. Let p ⊆ BVar (p)× BVar (p) denote the relation given by
x p y if qxqy.
Clearly, p is a partial order on BVar (p); it is called the subformula order of p .
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5.2. Semantics
We now introduce the semantics of coalgebraic ﬁxed point logic. Although we are primarily
interested in the interpretation of sentences, we also need to worry about the semantics of formulas
with free variables. For this purpose we deﬁne the notion of an F-model over a set of variables.
Deﬁnition 5.6. Let F be an R-standard endofunctor on Set, and let X be a set of variables. An
F-model over X is a triple (S , , V) such that  = (S , ) is an F-coalgebra, and V : X → P(S) is a
valuation on .
Given such a valuation on , a variable x ∈ X and a subset T ⊆ S , we deﬁne the valuation
V [x )→ T ] as the map given by V [x )→ T ](x) = T while V [x )→ T ](y) = V(y) for all variables y ∈ X
that are distinct from x.
Of course, it would bemore in style with the coalgebraic paradigm to present an F-model (S , , V)
over X as a coalgebra for the functor FP(X) (cf. Deﬁnition 3.1). We follow the present approach be-
cause it seems to lend itself better towards the treatment of ﬁxed point operators.
Deﬁnition 5.7. Inductively we deﬁne the notion of truth, i.e., we deﬁne when a LF(X)-formula p is
true or holds at a state s of a coalgebra  = (S , ) under the valuation V .
More precisely, we deﬁne a relation V ⊆ S × LF(X); when the pair (s, p) belongs to V , we
say that p is true at or holds in s ∈  under the valuation V , and usually write , V , sp . We also
use [[·]] for the extension of a formula in a coalgebra: [[p]],V := {s ∈ S | , V , sp}.
The clauses of the inductive truth deﬁnition are as follows:
, V , s,
, V , s * ⊥,
, V , sx if s ∈ V(x),
, V , sp ∧ q if , V , sp and , V , sq,
, V , sp ∨ q if , V , sp or , V , sq,
, V , sx.p if s ∈⋂{T ⊆ S | [[p]],V [x )→T ] ⊆ T },
, V , s>x.p if s ∈⋃{T ⊆ S | T ⊆ [[p]],V [x )→T ]},
, V , s∇ if ((s),) ∈ F(VBase () ),
where, in the last clause, the set VBase () ⊆ S × LF(X) is given as VBase () = V ∩ (S ×
Base ()).
We say that a formula p is true throughout a model = (, V), notation:p , if [[p]] ⊆ S . A
formula is valid, notation: |= p , if it is true throughout every model; two formulas p and q are called
equivalent, notation: p ≡ q, if [[p]] = [[q]] for every model.
All clauses of this truth deﬁnition are completely standard, with the possible exception of the one
for ∇. The standard deﬁnition from the literature (cf. Moss [17]) would require that , V , s∇ if
((s),) ∈ F(). However, given our deﬁnition of the language, and the guideline that the truth of a
formula should only depend on the interpretation of its immediate subformulas, the truth deﬁnition
of ∇ seems to be quite natural. Fortunately, since any such  belongs to the set F(Base ()), it
follows from Proposition 2.2 that the two deﬁnitions are equivalent.
Concerning the ﬁxed point operators, it will be convenient to introduce some further terminology.
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Deﬁnition 5.8. Let S be a set, and ϕ : P(S)→ P(S) a map. A subset X ⊆ S is called a pre-ﬁxed point
of ϕ if ϕ(X) ⊆ X , a post-ﬁxed point if X ⊆ ϕ(X), and a ﬁxed point if X = ϕ(X).
It then immediately follows from the deﬁnitions that the set [[x.p]] is the intersection of the
collection of all pre-ﬁxed points of the map <∼ X ∈ P(S).[[p]][x )→X ], while [[>x.p]] is the union of
the collection of all post-ﬁxed points of this map.
5.3. Basic semantic results
Before we can do anything interesting, there are a few technicalities that we have to get out of
the way. First, we need a Finiteness Lemma stating that the truth of a formula only depends on its
free variables.
Proposition 5.9 (Finiteness).Let F be an R-standard endofunctor on Set, let Y ⊆ X be two sets of
variables, and let (S , ) be an F-coalgebra. Now suppose that V and V ′ are two X -valuations on
 such that V(y) = V ′(y) for all y ∈ Y. Then for all p with FVar (p) ⊆ Y , and all s ∈ S it holds
that
S , , V p iff S , , V ′p.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the complexity of p . All cases are completely standard, with the
possible exception of the case that p = ∇. Inductively we assume thatVBase () = V









. From this it is immediate by the deﬁnition that S , , V ∇
iff S , , V ′∇. 
For sentences in particular, it follows from the previous proposition that it does not matter which
valuation we take into consideration. This inspires the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 5.10. Let F be an R-standard endofunctor on Set, p a LF-sentence,  an F-coalgebra
and s a point in . Then we say that p is true at s in , notation: , sp , if , V , sp for some
valuation V , (or, equivalently, for all valuations V ).
Next we turn to the Monotonicity Lemma.
Proposition 5.11 (Monotonicity). Let F be an R-standard endofunctor on Set, X a set of variables,
and  an F-coalgebra. Now suppose that V and V ′ are two X -valuations on  such that V(x) ⊆ V ′(x)
for all x ∈ X . Then for all p with FVar (p) ⊆ X it holds that
[[p]],V ⊆ [[p]],V ′ ,
that is: for all s ∈ S we have that S , , V p only if S , , V ′p.
Proof.This can be proved by a standard induction on the complexity of p . The proof in the inductive
case of p = ∇ is based on the fact that F is monotone (Fact 1). 
Remark 5.12. The Monotonicity Lemma justiﬁes the terminology ﬁxed point in the name of our
formalism: by the Knaster-Tarski Theorem in ﬁxed point theory, every monotone operation ϕ on
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a complete lattice (such as a full power set) has a least and a greatest ﬁxed point, and these can
be obtained as the intersection of the collections of pre-ﬁxed points and post-ﬁxed points of ϕ,
respectively. In particular, for every formula p and every model  = (S , , V), the set [[x.p]] is
the least ﬁxed point of the operation <∼ X ∈ P(S). [[p]][x )→X ], and the set [[>x.p]] is the greatest
ﬁxed point of this operation.
Remark 5.13. It also follows from standard ﬁxed point theory that least and greatest ﬁxed points
of monotone operations on complete lattices (such as full power set algebras) can be approximated
by ordinal unfoldings. This yields a nice connection between our coalgebraic ﬁxed point logic, and
more standard coalgebraic logics.
LetLF∞(X), the language of inﬁnitary coalgebraic F-logic, be the smallest collection S of formulas
which includes the set {,⊥} ∪ X and satisﬁes (i) if  is some ordinal, and {p |  < } is a set of




< p belong to S , and (ii) if  belongs to FQ for some
Q ⊆ S , then ∇ belongs to S . Note that F-models, with the obvious interpretation for ∧ and ∨,
form a natural semantics for this language.
Now for each ordinal  there is a translation t mapping LF-sentences to LF∞-formulas. This
translation is deﬁned as follows; ﬁrst, we deﬁne, for any LF∞(X)-formula p , any variable x ∈ X , and
any ordinal , the formulas .p and >x.p via transﬁnite induction:
0x.p := ⊥,
+1x.p := p[x.p/x],




Using these formulas, one puts
tp := p for p ∈ {,⊥} ∪ X ,
t(p q) := tp tq for ∈ {∧,∨},
t(@x.p) := @x.tp for @ ∈ {, >},
t(∇) := ∇(Ft)().
Observe that t translates LF-sentences into variable-free LF∞-formulas.
One can show that these translations locally embed LF inside LF∞, in the following sense:
[[p]] = [[tp]], for any F-model = (S , , V) and any ordinal  > |S|+. (11)
Note however, that in general, the ‘unfolding ordinal’  of (11) depends on the size of the model.
Coalgebraic ﬁxed point logic cannot be embedded in inﬁnitary coalgebraic logic, as is known from
the modal -calculus.
An important property of our coalgebraic ﬁxed point logic is that truth is bisimulation invari-
ant. Using the appropriate notion of bisimulation for F-models this can be proven for arbitrary
LF-formulas, but here we state it just for sentences.
Proposition 5.14. Let  and ′ be two F-coalgebras. Then for any bisimulation Z ⊆ S × S ′ and any
two points s ∈ S , s′ ∈ S ′ with (s, s′) ∈ Z , and any LF-sentence p it holds that
, sp iff ′, s′p.
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Proof.A simple proof for this proposition uses the ordinal unfolding of Remark 5.13, and the easily
established fact that truth of LF∞-sentences is a bisimulation invariant property. 
We are now ready to state our last basic semantic result.
Proposition 5.15 (Normal form). Let F be an R-standard endofunctor on Set. Then every formula
p ∈ LF is equivalent to some clean, guarded formula p ′.
Proof. It is easy to rewrite an arbitraryLF-formula into a clean equivalent, by consistently renam-
ing bound variables.
The second part of the proposition is proved by a completely standard induction on the com-
plexity of formulas. We conﬁne ourselves to a proof sketch for the case that p is of the form x.q.
By the inductive hypothesis we may assume that q is guarded. Hence, if we replace every ﬁxed
point subformula @y.r(x, y) of q with its unfolding r(x, @y.r(x, y)), we obtain an equivalent q′ of q,
in which the only unguarded occurrences of x are outside the scope of ﬁxed point operators. Then,
using laws of classical propositional logic, it is not hard to rewrite q′(x) in an equivalent form
q′′(x) = (x ∨ r(x)) ∧ s(x), where all occurrences of x in r(x) and s(x) are guarded. It can subsequently
be shown that x.(x ∨ r(x)) ∧ s(x) is equivalent to the formula x.r(x) ∧ s(x). 
Now that we have explained the syntax and semantics of coalgebraic ﬁxed point logic, we brieﬂy
describe how it generalizes the modal -calculus.
Example 5.16. Fix a set Prop of atomic propositions and a set Act of atomic actions. We will show
that the language of the modal -calculus, in the formulation of Janin and Walukiewicz [12] (see
Example 5.2) is in fact expressively equivalent to our coalgebraic ﬁxed point logic for the functor
FS = P(Prop)× P(S)Act.
First, if we consider an arbitraryLF-formula of the form∇, it is easy to see that  can be repre-
sented as a pair (P , {?a | a ∈ Act}), with P ⊆ Prop a set of atomic propositions, and each?a a ﬁnite












On the basis of this it is straightforward to deﬁne a truth invariant translation from LF-formulas
to formulas in the modal -calculus.
Conversely, one may show that every coalgebraic ﬁxed point formula for the functor F deﬁned
above has an equivalent modal ﬁxed point formula. To see why this is so, ﬁrst observe that for any
action a, the formulas a→ ∅ and a→ {} are equivalent to [a]⊥ and 〈a〉, respectively. Hence,
the formula  can be represented as the disjunction (a→ ∅) ∨ (a→ {}). Now for simplicity we
assume thatAct consists of two elements, a1 and a2. It follows that, for instance, the formula a1 → ?
can be rewritten as
(a1 → ?) ≡
∨
P⊆Prop
∇(P , {(a1,?), (a2,∅)}) ∨ ∇(P , {(a1,?), (a2, {})}).
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∇(P , {(a1,?1), (a2,?2)}).
From these two observations it is again completely straightforward to obtain a function mapping
modal -formulas to equivalent coalgebraic ﬁxed point formulas.
6. Game semantics
In this section, we develop a game-theoretic characterization of the semantics of our coalgebraic
ﬁxed point logics, generalizing results on for instance the modal -calculus to a general coalgebraic
framework.
6.1. Evaluation games
Given an F-model = (S , , V) and a coalgebraic ﬁxed point formula q, we will deﬁne the eval-
uation game E = E(q,) as the following inﬁnite two-player graph game.
Deﬁnition 6.1. Let F be an R-standard endofunctor on Set. Given an F-model = (S , , V) and a
clean coalgebraic ﬁxed point formula q, we ﬁrst deﬁne the arena of the evaluation game E = E(q,).
The board of E is given as the set
B = Sfor(q)× S ∪ P(Sfor(q)× S).
The partition of B into positions for ∃ and ∀, respectively, and the edge relation E of the graph are
given by the table of Fig. 1.
Note that positions of the form (x, s) or (@x.p , s) have a unique successor, whence the moves that
are made at such positions are completely determined. Thus, it does not matter to which player
these positions are assigned.
To get some intuitions for this kind of game, the reader is advised to assign the following aims to
the players. Basically, in a position (p , s) it is the aim of ∃ to show that p is actually true at s, while
∀ tries to convince her that this is not the case. This already explains the rules for positions of the
form (p , s) with p an atomic constant, a conjunction, or a disjunction. For instance, in (p1 ∨ p2, s),
∃ may win by winning either (p1, s) or (p2, s), because p1 ∨ p2 holds at s if either p1 or p2 does.
Each time during a match when the pebble moves from a position (x, s) to its successor (qx, s), we
say that the ﬁxed point variable x is unfolded. Roughly spoken, the intuition behind this is that the
formula @x.qx (represented by x) is equivalent to the formula qx[@x.qx/x] (represented by qx). This
applies to both  and >-variables. The difference between the two kinds of ﬁxed point variables,
which only comes out in inﬁnite matches, can be put in the following slogan: all ﬁxed points mean
unfolding, and least ﬁxed points mean ﬁnite unfolding. To make this more precise, we need the
following observation.
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Fig. 1. Admissible moves in the evaluation game.
Proposition 6.2.LetF be anR-standard endofunctor onSet, q a cleanLF-formula and anF-model.
Then in any inﬁnite match  of the game E(q,), the set of variables that are unfolded inﬁnitely often
during  contains a maximal member (in the subformula order).
Proof. Let U be the set of variables that are unfolded inﬁnitely often during . Since  is an inﬁnite
game, and q has only ﬁnitely many subformulas,U is non-empty.We claim thatU is in fact directed
(with respect to the subformula order q). The claim of the Proposition is then immediate by the
fact that U is ﬁnite.
Suppose for contradiction that x and y are in U while x and y are incomparable with respect
to q, that is, neither qxqy nor qyqx . Since both x and y get unfolded inﬁnitely often during ,
the match can never go into one of the formulas, say, qx, and stay there. But then the only way to
get back, from a position inside qx, to a position where y can be unfolded, is through unfolding a
variable z such that both qx and qy are subformulas of qz . Since this must happen inﬁnitely often,
one such variable z must be in U . Hence U is directed. 
Deﬁnition 6.3. Let F be an R-standard endofunctor on Set. Given an F-model = (S , , V) and a
clean coalgebraic ﬁxed point formula q, we now deﬁne thewinning conditions of the evaluation game
E = E(q,).
Let  be a full match played on the arena of E .
• If  is ﬁnite then it is lost by the player who got stuck (and thus, won by their adversary).
• If  is inﬁnite, let x be the highest ranking ﬁxed point variable that got unfolded in-
ﬁnitely often during . Now  is won by ∃ if x is a >-variable, and by ∀ if x is a
>-variable.
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6.2. Adequacy of game semantics
The following theorem states that the evaluation games as introduced above, indeed constitute
an equivalent characterization for the semantics of coalgebraic ﬁxed point formulas.
Theorem 1 (Adequacy). Let F be an R-standard endofunctor on Set. Then for any clean LF-formula
q, any F-model = (S , , V) and any state s ∈ S it holds that
, sq iff (q, s) ∈Win ∃(E(q,)). (12)
Proof. The proof of this theorem proceeds by induction on the complexity of the formula q. We
leave the base step (p ∈ {,⊥} or p is a variable), the boolean cases, and the greatest ﬁxed point
case of the inductive step as exercises for the reader.
We do treat the inductive case where q is of the form q = x.q′. First consider the direction (⇒)
of (12). Let W be the set of states w ∈ S such that (w, q) is a winning position for ∃ in E = E(q,).
To show that [[q]] ⊆ W it sufﬁces to prove that W is a preﬁxed point of the map <∼ X.[[q′]][x )→X ].
Abbreviate V ′ := V [x )→ X ] and′ := (S , , V ′), and let t ∈ S be an arbitrary state in [[q′]]′ , that
is, ′, tq′. It sufﬁces to show that t ∈ W ; in other words, we have to provide ∃ with a winning
strategy in E(q,) starting from position (q, t).
First, note that it follows inductively from′, tq′ that ∃ has a winning strategy f ′ from position
(q′, t) in the evaluation game E ′ = E(q′,′). Now observe that E and E ′ are in fact very similar
games: apart from the fact that E ′ has no positions of the form (q, u), the only difference between
the two games concerns positions of the form (x, u). In E ′, x is a free variable, so in a position (x, u),
the match is over, and the winner of such a match depends on whether u belongs to V ′(x) = W
or not. In E on the other hand, x is a bound variable, so at a state (x, u), the variable x will get
unfolded.
Second, observe that by deﬁnition of W , for every state w ∈ W , ∃ has a winning strategy fw for
the game E initialized at (w, q). Note that in this initialized game, the second position invariably
will be (w, q′). So ∃ could not have spoiled her chances in this ﬁrst round, and hence fw is winning
for ∃ in E at (w, q′) as well.
Now suppose that ∃ plays E from (q, t) according to the following strategy g:
• after the initial move, the pebble is in position (q′, t);
• ∃ ﬁrst plays her strategy f ′;
• as soon as a position (x, u) is reached, distinguish the following two cases:
(1) if u ∈ W then ∃ continues with fu;
(2) if u *∈ W then ∃ continues with a random strategy.
We now claim that this strategy g is in fact a winning strategy for ∃ in the game E initialized at
(q, t). To see why this must be so, make the following case distinction concerning an arbitrary full
play  which is consistent with g:
No state (x, u) is ever reached. This means that  doubles as an E-match and an E ′-match. As
an E ′-match,  is won by ∃. Since E and E ′ only differ when it comes to x, this means that  is
also a win for ∃ in E . Note that it does not matter here whether  is ﬁnite or inﬁnite.
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At some stage a position (x, u) is reached. In the E ′-perspective on , the match would have
reached a ﬁnal position here. Since f ′ was a winning strategy for ∃, this can only happen if
u ∈ V ′(x) = W . (In other words, case 2 mentioned above will never occur.) So ∃ consequently
plays according to fu; the ﬁrst position after (x, u) is (q′, u). We know that fu is a winning
strategy for ∃ in the game E initialized at (q′, u). It is then easy to see that any continuation of
the match in which ∃ plays fu, is won by ∃.
Altogether this shows that indeed, g is a winning strategy for ∃.
We now consider, still for the inductive case in which q = x.q′, the direction (⇐) of (12). Assume
that ∃ has a winning strategy f in the game E = E(x.q′,), and suppose for contradiction that
, s * x.q′. Abbreviating Q := [[x.q′]], this means that s *∈ Q.
First consider an arbitrary point t *∈ Q. It follows from , t * x.q′ that there is a preﬁxed
point U ⊆ S of the map <∼ X ⊆ S.[[q′]][x )→X ] to which t does not belong. That is, t *∈ U while
[[q′]][x )→U ] ⊆ U . It follows that t *∈ [[q′]][x )→U ], or, equivalently, that [x )→ U ], t * q′. By the
inductive hypothesis then, ∃ does not have a winning strategy in E(q′,[x )→ U ]) from (q′, t).
But since Q ⊆ U (because U is a preﬁxed point of the map <∼ X ⊆ S.[[q′]][x )→X ], and Q is the
intersection of all such preﬁxed points), it easily follows from the rules of the game that ∃ does
not have a winning strategy in the game E ′ := E(q′,[x )→ Q]) from (q′, t) either. That is, for
each strategy g of ∃ starting at (q′, t), ∀ has a counter strategy g¯t such that the match of E ′
determined by g and gt is won by ∀.
Furthermore, observe that because of the resemblance between the games E and E ′, any strategy
g of ∃ in E , as a map restricted to partial E ′-matches, uniquely determines a strategy in E ′; this
strategy will be denoted as g as well.
Now consider thematches of E , starting at (x.q′, s), in which ∃ plays according to her supposedly
winning strategy f . Suppose that ∀ counters the strategy f as follows:
• ∀ starts with the strategy f s;
• from that moment on, ∀ sticks to the current strategy, unless a position (x, u) is reached; now
distinguish cases:
(1) if u ∈ Q then ∀ continues with a random strategy;
(2) if u *∈ Q then ∀ plays as follows. Let  be the match this far (including (x, u)), and let f denote
the strategy of ∃ for the E-game starting at (q′, u) given by f(%) = f(%). Then by our earlier
discussion, f can be seen as an E ′-strategy for matches starting at (q′, u), and so ∀may adopt
his counter strategy (f)u from this moment on.
Consider the E-match  starting at (x.q′, s) determined by ∃ playing her strategy f and ∀ using
the strategy deﬁned above. First observe that  can pass through positions of the form (x, u) only
ﬁnitely many times, for otherwise, the-variable x would be the highest ﬁxed point variable unfold-
ed inﬁnitely often, contradicting the assumption that f is winning for ∃. Second, note that the ﬁrst
case of passing a state (x, u) will never occur; since arriving at a position (x, u) with u ∈ Q would
mean that, contrary to our earlier conclusion, ∃ would have a successful strategy in E ′ at a point
v *∈ Q after all.
This means, however, that after a certain initial partial play , ending in a position (x, u) with
u *∈ Q, ∀ will stick to his strategy (f)u, while no further position (v, x) is ever reached. It follows
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from our assumptions on (f)u that the match % resulting from ∃ playing f against ∀ playing (f)u
is winning for ∀ in E ′, and from this it is not hard to derive that the E-match ( = % is won by ∀.
This provides the desired contradiction, since it shows that the strategy f is not winning for ∃ after
all.
This ﬁnishes the inductive case where q = x.q′, so we now turn to the case where
q = ∇. To prove the equivalence of (12), ﬁrst assume that , s∇, and consider the game
E = E(q,). Let ∃, in the game E initialized at (∇, s), choose the set Z := Base () as her
ﬁrst move. Note that it follows by deﬁnition from , s∇ that ((s),) ∈ , so this is a
legitimate move. Now suppose that ∀ moves at position Z , choosing (p , t) ∈ Z as the next po-
sition. It follows from (p , t) ∈ Z and the inductive hypothesis that in the game E(p ,), ∃ has
a winning strategy starting from (p , t). But then it is easy to see that this strategy will also
guarantee her winning E(∇,) from (p , t). All in all we have provided her with a strategy
winning E from (∇, s).
For the other direction of (12), suppose that ∃ wins the game E = E(q,) starting at
position (∇, s). Let’s say that her choice at position (∇, s) is the set Z ⊆ Base()× S .
Since, at position Z , ∀ may choose any (r, t) ∈ Z , we may assume that each such (r, t)
is winning for ∃ in E(r,). It thus follows from the inductive hypothesis that Z ⊆ ,
whence we see that Z ⊆ Base () . Hence by monotonicity of F we obtain that F(Z) ⊆
F(Base () ). But we know that (, (s)) ∈ Z , for if not, then Z would have been ille-
gitimate. So we ﬁnd that (, (s)) ∈ F(Base () ), precisely what is needed to show that
, s∇. 
7. Automata and ﬁxed point formulas
The reader will have noticed the similarity between the evaluation game of a formu-
la and the acceptance game of an automaton. But the connection is much tighter than a
mere resemblance, witness the theorems below, which show that the F-automata have the
same expressive strength as the logical formalism LF when it comes to describing pointed
F-coalgebras.
Theorem 2 (Formulas are automata). Let F be an R-standard endofunctor on Set. Then any LF-
sentence p can be transformed into a parity F-automaton p such that for any pointed F-coalgebra
(, s):
, sp iff p accepts (, s).
Proof. By Proposition 5.15 we can assume without loss of generality that p is clean, and by Proposi-
tion 4.16, it sufﬁces to construct a logical F-automaton p . The structure of p will closely resemble
that of the set Sfor(p) of subformulas of p .
In fact, we can identify the states of p with the subformulas of p , and let p := aI be
the initial state of p . Now deﬁne the following transition function  on Sfor(p) (where
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(q ∨ q′) := q unionsq q′




With this deﬁnition, we have established that for any F-coalgebra , the boards of the acceptance
game G = G(p ,) and of the evaluation game E = E(p ,) are in fact identical. Hence in particular,
the matches of the two games coincide.
The only thing left is to deﬁne a parity function on A that takes proper care of the winning con-
ditions of the evaluation game E . Using the construction tree of the formula p , it is easy to deﬁne a
function  : Sfor(p)→ ω such that
•  (q) = 0 if q *∈ BVar(p),
•  (x) is odd if x is a -variable, and even if x is a >-variable,
•  (x)   (y) if x p y (i.e., if @xx.px@yy.py ).
It is then straightforward to verify that ∃ is the winner of a match  in G if and only if she is the
winner of , seen as a match of E . From this it is immediate that Win ∃(G) =Win ∃(E), and hence
the theorem follows by the Adequacy Theorem of the game semantics of LF. 
Conversely, one can show that, given a parity F-automaton , one can construct a LF-formula
q that holds precisely at those pointed F-coalgebras that are accepted by .
Theorem 3 (Automata are formulas). Let F be an R-standard endofunctor on Set. Then any parity
F-automaton  can be transformed into a LF-sentence q such that for any pointed F-coalgebra
(, s):
 accepts (, s) iff , sq.
Proof. Since this result is rather standard (see for instance [7, Theorem 11.6]), we conﬁne ourselves
to a sketch of its proof.
As an auxiliary notion we need to adapt the concept of an F-automaton to a device that operates
on F-models. Given a set X of variables, a (logical) F,X -automaton is a quadruple = (A, aI ,, ),
where A, aI and  are as before, while the transition map is now a function  : A→ DL(X ∪ FA).
The acceptance game of such a device is like that for ordinary logical automata, with the proviso
that a position of the form (x, s) marks an immediate end to the match, the winner being ∃ if x is
true at s, and ∀ if x is false at s.
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Observe that this concept generalizes that of ordinary logical F-automata: these can be seen as
specimens of the new device over the empty set of variables. This means that by Proposition 4.14,
we may prove the theorem by establishing the following claim.
Claim. For every setX and for everyF,X -automaton, there is aLF-formula q withFVar (p)
⊆ X , such that for all F,X -models (, V), and all points s in :
 accepts (, V , s) iff , V , sq. (13)
The proof of this claim proceeds by induction on the index of  (this notion is deﬁned for F,X -
automata just like for F-automata). Without loss of generality we may assume that states in  of
maximum parity must belong to some strongly connected component C of  such that ind () =
#( [C]).
If ind () = 0, then there are no inﬁnite →-paths. Deﬁne the height h(a) of a state a ∈ A as
the length k of the longest →-path a→ a1 → . . .→ ak starting at a, and put, for n  0,
An := {a ∈ A | h(a)  n}. Furthermore, for a ∈ A, let a be the automaton (A, a,, ), that is, the
automaton  but with a as its initial state.
By a subinduction on the height of a we then prove that there is a (ﬁxed point free) formula pa
of the right shape that characterizes the pointed F,X -models that are accepted by a. In the base
case of this subinduction, we are dealing with a state a of height zero. It is easy to see that for such
a, we have that (a) ∈ DL(X), so that we may put pa := (a).
In the induction step of the subinduction, we have h(a) = n+ 1. Then by the inductive hypoth-
esis we may assume the existence of a total map pn : An → LF assigning to each state b ∈ An its
associated formula p(b). Also note that each  ∈ FA occurring in (a) must actually belong to
FAn. It is then straightforward to verify that for each such , the object ∇(Fpn)() is a formula
in LF(X). Now deﬁne pa as the formula we obtain by replacing every  ∈ FA occurring in the
DL(X ∪ FAn)-term (a) with the formula ∇(Fpn)(). Clearly then, pa has the right format. It is in
fact also straightforward to prove that pa characterizes the F,X -models that are accepted by a;
details are left to the reader.
For the inductive case (of the main induction), assume that ind () > 0. Let m be the maximum
parity of the states of A, and deﬁneM = {a1, . . . , ak} as the set of states of that actually have parity
m. Now consider the F,X ∪M -automaton
M := (A \M , aI ,A\M , A\M ).
That is, we have turned the states of M into (new) variables. Furthermore, for i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, let
i = (A \M , ai,A\M , A\M ) be the version of M which has ai as its initial position. It follows
from our assumptions on andM , that each of these automata has a smaller index than. Wemay
thus apply the inductive hypothesis, which provides ﬁxed point formulas pM , p1, …, pk , all taking
free variables from the set X ∪M , and such that for any F,X ∪M -model (, V) and any point s in
, we have that M accepts (, V , s) iff , V , spM , and, for each i, i accepts (, V , s) iff , V , spi .
Clearly then, for any F,X ∪M -model (, V), the k-tuple p determines a monotone map [[p]],V :
(P(S))k → (P(S))k given by
[[p]],V (T1, . . . , Tk) :=
(
[[p1]],V [a)→T ], . . . , [[p1]],V [a)→T ]
)
.
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Here V [a )→ T ] denotes the valuation given by V [a )→ T ](ai) = Ti while V [a )→ T ](x) = V(x) for all
variables x ∈ X \M . It follows from standard ﬁxed point theory (see for instance [7, Theorem20.12]),
that the least and greatest ﬁxed points of this map are given byLF-formulas. More precisely, there




1 , . . . , p
>
k , all with free variables in X , such that
([[p1 ]],V , . . . , [[pk ]],V ) is the least ﬁxed point of [[p]],V
for every F,X -model (, V), and likewise for the greatest ﬁxed point.
Now let q be the formula
q := pM [p@/a].
That is, we uniformly substitute, in pM , each ai with the formula p
@
i , where @ denotes  if m is odd,
and > if m is even. The proof that this formula q indeed satisﬁes (13) is fairly similar to the proof
of the Adequacy Theorem, whence we omit further details. 
As a corollary to this Theorem, we mention a result that was ﬁrst observed by Alexandru Baltag
(personal communication).
Corollary 7.1. Let F be an R-standard set functor, and let (, s) be some ﬁnite pointed F-coalgebra.
Then there is a LF-formula q,s such that for any pointed F-coalgebra (′, s′)
′, s′q,s iff , s↔ ′, s′.
Proof. Deﬁne q,s as the formula obtained by applying (the algorithm in the proof of) Theorem
3 to the automaton ,s of Deﬁnition 4.8. Then the result is immediate by Proposition 4.9 and
Theorem 3. 
8. Further research
We believe that our F-automata provide a good notion of an automaton for classifying pointed
F-coalgebras. Not only do F-automata generalize the familiar devices operating on words, trees and
graphs, but the notion is also stable under a number of natural variations, and it is equivalent to a
natural coalgebraic ﬁxed point logic. It therefore seems interesting and useful to develop the theory
of F-automata further, and to apply this theory to the study of coalgebraic ﬁxed point logics. It is
obvious that in this paper we have only scratched the surface of these topics. Of the many questions
that naturally arise we just mention the following.
(1) In our opinion, the most interesting line of research is to take a coalgebraic perspective on the
study of the recognizing power of automata. The point here is that many familiar theorems
concerning the expressivity of automata as mechanisms for recognizing structures, can now be
parametrized by the coalgebraic functor type. It is thus a natural problem to ﬁnd out whether
(the analogs of) these theorems hold for coalgebras of arbitrary type F. If so, it might be of
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interest to ﬁnd a uniform, coalgebraic proof for the result, and if not, we have arrived at an
interesting property that an endofunctor on Set could or could not have.
To be a bit more speciﬁc, recall that some of the most important results in automata theory
concern the following kinds of questions:
simpliﬁcation Given an automaton of a certain type (say, a nondeterministic automa-
ton), can it be transformed into a equivalent automaton of a simpler kind (say, a de-
terministic one)?
closure propertiesCall a classC of pointed F-coalgebrasA-recognizable, whereA is a class of
F-automata, if there is some automaton  in A such that C is the class of pointed F-coalge-
bras that are accepted by . Is the collection of A-recognizable classes closed under natural
operations such as union, intersection, complementation, projection?
Such questions can now be formulated as questions about the functor F. The ﬁrst re-
sults in this direction are promising. In [14], Clemens Kupke and I prove that for any
R-standard functor F, the class of languages that are recognizable by an arbitrary F-au-
tomaton is closed under taking unions, intersections and projections. Our main technical
result concerns a construction which transforms a given alternating F-automaton into an
equivalent non-deterministic one.
Many interesting problems remain, however. To mention one speciﬁc question: for which
functors F can we prove a Complementation Lemma? That is, for which functors F can we
always ﬁnd, given a (non-deterministic) F-automaton , another (non-deterministic) F-au-
tomaton , with the property that a pointed F-coalgebra is accepted by  iff it is rejected
by ?
(2) Our parity F-automata have a coalgebraic shape themselves: the automaton  = (A, aI ,, )
can, at least object-wise, be represented as a pointed coalgebra over the functor FAutS =
P(P(FS))× ω. This perspective clearly needs investigation — recall that the coalgebraic per-
spective on ordinary automata (operating on ﬁnite words) has already proven to be very
enlightening, see Rutten [24].
(3) Our deﬁnition of coalgebraic ﬁxed point logic is only one out of many. In fact, ﬁxed point
operators may be added to any kind of language of coalgebraic logic. It would be good to see
more case studies on coalgebraic ﬁxed point logics from an automata-theoretic perspective.
Related to one of the above questions, one would like to understand what happens if we add
negation to the languageLF discussed in Section 5. But also, the relation between our system
and ﬁxed point extensions of the coalgebraic modal logics developed in Pattinson [21] would
be an interesting object of study.
(4) As already mentioned in the introduction, there are earlier studies of automata that are based
on categories and functors, see for instance Adámek and Trnková [2]. This connection clearly
has to be investigated further.
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